A Comparative Analysis of Shareholder Protections in Italy and the United States: Parmalat as a Case Study by Segato, Lorenzo




A Comparative Analysis of Shareholder Protections
in Italy and the United States: Parmalat as a Case
Study
Lorenzo Segato
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
Part of the Corporation and Enterprise Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Lorenzo Segato, A Comparative Analysis of Shareholder Protections in Italy and the United States: Parmalat as a Case Study, 26 Nw. J.
Int'l L. & Bus. 373 (2005-2006)
A Comparative Analysis of
Shareholder Protections in Italy and




The Parmalat Group, Italy's eighth largest company, ranked within the
top ten international companies in the food products industry,' collapsed
and entered bankruptcy protection in 2003 after disclosing that some $9
billion was missing from its accounts. Its controlling shareholder and
management have been indicted for fraud. Parmalat investors around the
world, principally in Italy and the United States, who bought Parmalat
shares and bonds based on false information, were significantly damaged by
this fraudulent behavior.
The goal of this article is to compare the protections offered to
minority shareholders by the Italian system of corporate law with those
offered by the U.S. legal system of corporate and securities law in order to
determine if Parmalat's minority shareholders would have been better off
had Parmalat been an American company listed in the U.S. financial
market. This analysis will reveal several weaknesses in Italian corporate
and securities laws, thereby providing a basis for suggestions on how to
improve minority shareholders' rights in Italy based on the U.S. experience.
Section II of this paper provides an overview of the structure of the
Parmalat group, which was dominated by a strong, active majority
shareholder and then discusses why Parmalat collapsed. It also describes the
financial frauds that dragged the company into bankruptcy, again
* Special thanks to Professor Randall S. Thomas (John S. Beasley Professor of Law and
Business at Vanderbilt University), Ms. Nancy Calonge and, most of all, my wife Lara
Zordan, for their help and support.
1 Forbes, Forbes International 500: Parmalat Finanziaria, available at
http://www.forbes.com (2003).
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underlining the determinant role of the controlling shareholder and
management. It further delineates the corporate monitoring structure and
analyzes whether Parmalat complied, at least formally, with the
recommended standards of corporate governance in Italy. Finally, this
section outlines the legal remedies used by the Italian minority shareholders
to attempt to obtain compensation for the harms they suffered because of
this collapse.
After a quick review of the legal sources of Italian corporate law,
section III of the paper offers an overview of the main innovations
introduced into Italian corporate law by the 2003 Reform movement. The
innovations changed the structure of corporate governance of Italian stock
companies and gave shareholders the opportunity to choose among three
different systems of corporate governance. The innovations also created the
mandatory requirement of an external auditor or auditing firm for each
affected company. Section III next discusses the methods offered by Italian
corporate law to protect listed companies' minority shareholders. It
concludes by discussing the role of the Commissione Nazionale per le
SocietAi e la Borsa ("CONSOB" or the Italian SEC) in protecting investors
and monitoring the transparency and efficiency of the financial markets.
Section IV gives a similar overview of the protection of listed companies'
minority shareholders in U.S. corporate law. It further explains the role of
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") in financial markets,
focusing on the SEC's investigatory and enforcement powers.
Section V addresses the question of how the U.S. system would have
protected the Parmalat minority shareholders had Parmalat been a U.S.
listed company. It finds that a Rule 1Ob-5 action would be an available
remedy for U.S. minority shareholders against perpetrators of fraud,
including the company. It analyzes the effectiveness of a private securities
fraud class action and its relation to SEC enforcement actions. It concludes
by suggesting that the Italian legal system, in light of what happened in the
Parmalat case, should introduce a private securities fraud class action
similar to the U.S. Rule lOb-5 action. It also suggests that the creation of
such a class action should be accompanied by a significant increase in the
powers of the CONSOB, specifically the power to enforce Italian securities
law, in order to guarantee an adequate recovery of damages for injured
shareholders and investors.
II. THE PARMALAT CASE: THE BIGGEST SCANDAL IN ITALIAN
FINANCIAL HISTORY
To most Italians, prior to 2003, Parmalat represented a shining
example of the Italian economic miracle. Calisto Tanzi, Parmalat's founder,
had taken his family's salami and preserves business and within thirty years
had transformed it into an industrial giant. Tanzi started by adopting new
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technologies and applying them to the milk business. After purchasing its
first agricultural business in Brazil in the 1970's, Parmalat grew at an
unprecedented rate of more than 50% a year.2 In addition to milk, Parmalat
branched out into other areas such as juices, sauces, baking products,
yogurts, soups, and mineral water. In the United States, Parmalat is known
for its Mother's Cookies brand, along with Black Diamond and Sunnydale
Farms products.3
By 2003, headquartered in the small northern Italian city of Parma
(from which Parmalat takes it name), the company was active in thirty
countries with its primary markets in North America, South America, and
Europe.4 Employing well over 30,000 employees and with revenues
reaching more than $7 billion, Parmalat was ranked 369 among Forbes' top
500 international companies in 2003 and ranked within the top ten in the
food products industry. 5 Moreover, Parmalat was Italy's eighth-largest
company and controlled 50% of the Italian market in milk and milk-
derivative products.
A. The Bankruptcy of the Group and the Accusation of Fraud
In 1997, Parmalat decided to become a "global player" in the world
economy and expand outside of the Italian market. Parmalat started a
campaign of international acquisitions, primarily in North and South
America, financed through debt.6 In a relatively short time, the group
became the third largest producer of cookies in the United States. But such
acquisitions, instead of bringing in profits, began to fail in 2001. Because
the group's operational activities continued to operate at a loss,
management decided to shift to the derivatives market and other speculative
enterprises. 7 Parmalat's founder and former CEO, Tanzi, led the group into
several different new enterprises, including a tourism agency called
Parmatour, and a local soccer club, Parma F.C. Huge amounts of money
were poured into these two enterprises, which had been running at a loss
from the very beginning. It has been reported that Parmatour, no longer in
business, had a loss of at least E 2 billion, an incredible sum for a tourism
agency. The losses of the Parma F.C. soccer club, on the other hand, have
not yet been completely uncovered. Since it became part of the Parmalat
2 Don Murray, Business as Usual CBC News Viewpoint, CBC/SRC,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/ viewpoint/vp-murray/20040112.html (2004).
3 Parmalat, http://www.parmalat.com (last visited 2003).
4 Murray, supra note 2.
5 Forbes, supra note 1.
6 See Claudio Celani, The Story Behind Parmalat's Bankruptcy, EXECUTIVE
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group, Parma F.C. purchased a remarkable number of high-priced soccer
players from South America, mainly Colombia. 9 These two enterprises that
at first glance could be deemed insignificant in the global analysis of the
Parmalat group, were "the tip of the iceberg" of an accurate and well-
organized "financial plan." In fact, while accumulating losses and with
debts owed to banks, Parmalat began to build a network of offshore mail-
box companies (most of them registered in the Cayman Islands, tax harbor),
which were used to hide losses through a mirror-game which made them
appear as assets or provide liquidity. At the same time, the company began
to issue bonds in order to raise capital.' 0 The security for such bonds was
provided by the alleged liquidity represented by the offshore schemes." The
largest bond underwriters were Bank of America, Citicorp, and J.P.
Morgan. These banks, bond issuers as well as bond holders, like their
European partners Deutsche Bank, Banco Santander, ABN and Italian,
Capitalia, S. Paolo-IMI, Intesa-BCI, Unicredito, Monte dei Paschi, and
many others, 12 rated Parmalat bonds as solid financial products. 3 While
Bank of America participated as a partner in some of Parmalat's
acquisitions, Citicorp is alleged to have played a substantial part in the
organization of the fraudulent accounting system.' 4 The New York-based,
Italian law firm Zini also played a central role in the Parmalat financial
plan. Through Zini, companies owned by Parmalat were sold to certain
American citizens with Italian surnames, only to be re-purchased later by
Parmalat. 15 The whole operation was a facade: the purchase price money for
the sale came from other entities owned by Parmalat and the sales served
only to create the appearance of liquidity on the books. Thanks to that
apparent liquidity, Parmalat was able to continue to issue its bonds.
The Parmalat crisis finally became public on December 8, 2003, when
Parmalat defaulted on a C 150 million bond. Parmalat management claimed
that this occurred because a customer, a speculative fund named Epicurum
Fund, defaulted on its bills. 16 Allegedly, Parmalat had won a derivatives
contract with Epicurum Fund, betting against the dollar. But it was soon
9 Id.
10 Id.
1 One of the off-shore mail-box firms used to channel the liquidity coming from the
sales of the bonds was called "Buconero," which means "black hole."
12 See Celani, supra note 6.
13 J.P. Morgan Chase sold the largest amount of Parmalat bonds for a total value of E 1.6
billion, i.e., 21% of the bonds circulating in the U.S. market. Most of these bonds became
part of investment and pension funds.
14 The first class-action suit in the United States on the Parmalat case was filed by the
South Alaskan Miners' Pension Fund and is against Parmalat, its auditors, Bank of America
and Citicorp.
15 See Celani, supra note 6.
16 See Peter Gumbel, How It All Went So Sour, TIME EuR., Nov. 23, 2004, at 44.
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discovered that Epicurum Fund was owned by firms whose addresses were
the same as some of Parmalat's own offshore entities.17 In other words,
Epicurum Fund was owned by Parmalat. On December 9, as rumors spread
that Parmalat's claimed liquidity did not exist, Standard & Poor's finally
downgraded the Parmalat bonds to junk status18 and in the next few days
Parmalat stocks fell 40%.19 Three days later, Parmalat management
somehow found the money to pay the bond, but on December 19 the game
ended: Bank of America announced that an alleged account with $3.9
billion in liquidity, which Parmalat claimed to hold with Bank of America,
did not exist.20 At that moment, the bankruptcy was revealed and Parmalat
stock fell an additional 66%.21 Later, Parmalat CFO Fausto Tonna would
confess that he had faked Bank of America documents, using a scanner,
scissors, and glue, to "invent" the $3.9 billion account.22 On December 22,
the Italian government rushed to pass emergency legislation in order to
allow Parmalat to quickly file for bankruptcy in order to protect its
industrial activity, payrolls, vendors, and others from creditors' claims. The
government appointed an administrator, Enrico Bondi, to devise and present
a reorganization plan for the Parmalat Group by January 20, 2004.23 The
government was extremely concerned about the more than 100,000 Italian
owners of Parmalat's bonds and shares, and therefore promised an
immediate review of the current legislation protecting investors. 24 The role
played by the Italian, European, and American banks is extremely
significant and dramatic. In fact, the banks had led unsophisticated
investors (workers, pensioners, and professionals) into making high-risk
investments. In most cases investors did not know where their money had
been invested or were told that it was invested in "safe" financial
products.25 On December 27 Calisto Tanzi and all of Parmalat's executives
were arrested under suspicion of fraud. Italian prosecutors investigated the
alleged fraud and asked that in addition to all Parmalat executives, Bank of
America and two auditors, Italian affiliates of Grant Thornton and Deloitte
& Touche, be put on trial.2 6
17 Id.





23 Parmalat, il governo vara il decreto, LA REPUBBLICA, Dec. 23, 2003, available at
http://www.repubblica.it/2003/l/sezioni/economia/parmalat/decreparma/decreparma.html.
24 Id.
25 See Celani, supra note 6.
26 Parmalat, Tanzi ai magistrati "Potevo salvare 'azienda ", LA REPUBBLICA, Dec. 28,
2003, available at http://www.repubblica.it/2003/l/sezioni/economia/parmalat2/vittore/
vittore.html.
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The first hearing of the Parmalat trial was held in October 2004.
Judges estimated that $9 billion had disappeared from the Parmalat
27accounts.  The investigation continues to find proof of where this huge
amount of money was concealed. Moreover, Tanzi is suspected of
misappropriating at least $600 million from the business over the years.28
To fully appreciate the gravity of the Parmalat scandal, it must be
mentioned that the amount of money missing from the company's accounts
represents about 0.8% of Italy's gross domestic product.29
The main question regarding Parmalat's collapse still remains: how
and why did this happen? Was it the fault of the two accounting firms,
Grant Thornton and Deloitte & Touche, for failing to properly audit
Parmalat's financial statements? Was it a consequence of the Italian
corporate governance rules, which permitted Tanzi and his management to
conceal huge amounts of money to the detriment of the shareholders and
investors? Or, finally, does the responsibility lie with the banks, which sold
Parmalat shares and bonds to their clients' investors allegedly without
knowing that Parmalat was in an unreliable financial situation? The goal of
this section is not to answer specifically the questions above, but rather to
give a description of the Parmalat structure in order to shed light on whether
effective protection of minority shareholders was guaranteed.
B. Ownership and Control Structure
Generally, Italian corporations, both listed and unlisted, are owned by
a small number of shareholders. These shareholders are often linked by
family ties or shareholders' agreements, and are willing and able to wield
their power over the corporation.30 Parmalat was a composite group of
companies controlled by a strong majority shareholder, the Tanzi family,
through a pyramidal device. In this type of organization a holding
company controls, directly or indirectly, the majority of voting rights of the
companies that are part of the organization. The ultimate control over the
entire organization is in the hands of either a single entrepreneur, a family
27 Id.
28 Alessandra Galloni et al., A Global Journal Report: Scandal at Parmalat Broadens;
Staff May Have Destroyed Files, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2003, at Al.
29 See Wolfgang Munchau, Parmalat Affair Has Plenty of Blame to Go Round, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 2003, at 15.
30 See Magda Bianco & Paola Casavola, Italian Corporate Governance: Effects on
Financial Structure and Firm Performance, 43 EUR. ECON. REV. 1057 (1999). See also
Andrea Melis, Corporate Governance Failures. To What Extent is Parmalat a Particularly
Italian Case?, available at http://www.ssm.com, at 4 & tbl. 1 (2004) (describing the
ownership and control structure of Italian listed companies).
31 Pyramidal groups, widespread in Italy, have been defined as "organizations where
legally independent firms are controlled by the same entrepreneur (the head of the group)
through a chain of ownership relations." See Bianco, supra note 30.
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(as in the Parmalat case), or a coalition.
Parmalat S.p.A., representing the core milk and dairy food business of
the Parmalat organization, had direct control of sixty-seven other companies
(as of December 31, 2002), and indirect control of many others.32 Parmalat
S.p.A. was an unlisted company and was controlled by Parmalat
Finanziaria, which owned 89.18% of Parmalat S.p.A. voting shares. The
remaining 10.82% of the shares were owned by Dalmata S.r.l., an unlisted
financial company which was fully controlled by Parmalat Finanziaria. The
latter company was listed on the Milano stock exchange and its majority
shareholder was Coloniale S.p.A., which owned 50.02% of the company's
voting share capital (49.16% of it was held directly, while 0.86% was
controlled indirectly through the Luxembourg based Newport S.A.). The
major minority investors of Parmalat Finanziaria were Landsome Partners
Limited Partnership (holding 2.06% of the company's capital) and Hermes
Focus Management Europe Limited (holding 2.20%). The holding company
of the organization, Coloniale S.p.A., was under the control of the Tanzi
family through several Luxembourg-based companies. The Tanzi family
was the ultimate shareholder controlling Parmalat Finanziaria and the entire
Parmalat organization. 33 Furthermore, the Tanzi family was the ultimate
shareholder of more than 50% of Parmalat's equity.
The prevailing control structure in Italian companies is characterized
by the existence of an active majority shareholder ("the blockholder") who
is willing and able to monitor the management of the company effectively.
34
This type of ownership and control structure seems to lessen the agency
problem between management and shareholders.35 In fact, managers who
seek to favor their personal interests to the detriment of the shareholders
could be immediately discharged by the controlling shareholder.36 In truth,
"the agency problem is only shifted towards the relationship between
different types of shareholders: the controlling shareholder and minority
32 See Melis, supra note 30, at 5.
33 See id. at fig. 1 (delineating a simplified structure of the Parmalat organization).
34 See Marco Becht, The Separation of Ownership and Control: A Survey of 7 European
Countries. Preliminary Report to the European Commission, Strong Blockholders, Weak
Owners and the Need of European Manadatory Disclosure, (European Corporate
Governance Network, ed. 1997). See generally MARIO MOLTENI, I SISTEMI DI CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE NELLE GRANDI IMPRESE ITALIANE (1997); ANREA MELIS, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE. UN'ANALISI EMPIRICA DELLA REALTA ITALIANA IN UN'OTTICA EUROPEA (G.
Giappichelli ed. 1997).
35 The agency problem concerns the relationships between management and shareholders
in a company. It consists of the fact that the shareholders should control the managers'
actions and behaviors in managing the company (unfortunately this does not happen very
often, especially in big companies with a large amount of shareholders).
36 See Melis, supra note 30, at 5.
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shareholder., 37 In fact, "the controlling shareholder may wield her power to
pursue its interests even at the expenses of the minority shareholders. 38
While in the United States the main corporate governance issue is defined
as "strong managers, weak owners, 39 the leading corporate governance
issue in Italy is about "weak managers, strong blockholders and unprotected
minority shareholders. 4 ° It will become clear in this section that in the
Parmalat case the blockholder, the Tanzi family, used its power in the
organization to pursue personal interests to the detriment of the minority
shareholders by funneling most of the Parmalat companies resources to the
family's personal accounts.
C. The Corporate Monitoring Structure
The corporate monitoring structure of Italian listed companies requires
the presence of two key gatekeepers: the board of statutory auditors, a
particularly Italian device, and the external auditing firm, a common
gatekeeper around the world. Each of these devices is briefly explained
below.
1. Board of Statutory Auditors
The board of statutory auditors has the duty to monitor the company
from the inside. Article 148 of the Legislative Decree n. 58/98 (the so-
called "Testo Unico della Intermediazione Finanziaria" or "T.U.I.F.")
establishes that a company's charter must indicate the number of auditors
(not less than three) and ensure that one (or two, depending upon whether
the board is composed of more than three auditors) of the auditors is
appointed by the minority shareholders. In this way the board can express
the will of all the shareholders.41 Parmalat Finanziaria's board of statutory
auditors was composed of three members, the legal minimum requirement.
The number of members on the board of statutory auditors directly affects
the level of protection for minority shareholders. In fact some powers (for
37 Melis, supra note 30, at 7 (citing Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and
Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. 3 (2000); Andrea Melis, Corporate Governance in Italy, 8
CORP. GOVERNANCE - AN INT'L. REV. 347 (2000)).
38 Melis G. - Melis A., Financial Reporting, Corporate Governance and Parmalat. Was
It a Financial Reporting Failure?, (2004) reprinted in GOVERNING THE CORPORATION:
REGULATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF SCANDAL AND GLOBAL MARKETS
239 (Justin O'Brien ed., 2005), available at http://www.ssrn.com, at 6.
39 MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS. THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
40 Melis, supra note 37, at 347-55.
41 Testo unico delle disposizioni in materia di intermediazione finanziaria, Decree-Law
no. 58/1998, Feb. 24, 1998, [1998] 2 Racc. Uff. 576, Gazz. Uff. Mar. 26, 1998. [hereinafter
T. U. I.F.].
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instance, the power to call a shareholders' meeting as a consequence of a
director's decision) can be exercised only by at least two members of the
board in concert. In a board composed of five members, minority
shareholders can elect two statutory auditors and thus have the ability to
call a shareholder meeting.42
During the last ten years the Parmalat Finanziaria board of statuto 7
auditors never reported any wrongdoing to the courts or to CONSOB. 43
Neither did the statutory auditors of Parmalat S.p.A. or any other of its
subsidiaries. It must be mentioned that in December 2002 a minority
shareholder of Parmalat Finanziaria, Hermes Focus Asset Management
Europe Ltd., brought a suit under article 2408 of the Civil Code (the main
issue of the claim was about related-parties transactions), and even then the
board of statutory auditors answered that "no irregularity was found either
de facto or de jure. ' 44 The clear inefficiency of the board of statutory
auditors has been connected to its lack of access to information related to
shareholders activities and its lack of independence from the controlling
shareholders .45
2. External Auditing Firms
Italian corporate law requires that the external auditing firm be
appointed at the shareholders' meeting. However, the board of statutory
auditors must give its opinion about the appointment of the external firm.
Article 159 of the T.U.I.F. establishes that the external auditing firm
appointment lasts three years and after two re-appointments (i.e., nine
years) the company must change its audit firm. Italy is the only major
economy that requires a mandatory external auditing firm rotation. 6 From
1990 to 1998 Grant Thornton S.p.A. was the Parmalat Finanziaria external
auditing firm. In 1999 Deloitte & Touche S.p.A. was appointed. However,
the required external auditing firm rotation, did not lead to the disclosure of
the accounting frauds perpetrated by Parmalat Finanziaria. In fact, for four
years, from 1999 to 2003, Deloitte & Touche S.p.A. did not notice any form
of fraud nor did it allege any irregularity related to the company's
42 See Andrea Melis, On the Role of the Board of Statutory Auditors in Italian Listed
Companies, 12 CoRP. GOVERNANCE- INT'L. REv. 74 (2004).
43 Lamberto Cardia, I rapporti tra il sistema delle imprese, i mercatifinanziari e la tutela
del risparmio, http://www.consob.it/main/documenti/Pubblicazioni/Audizioni/
audizione20gennaio2004.htm?hkeywords=&docid = I 6&page=0&hits=53&nonewsearch
= 1
(last visited Jan. 12, 2006) (Testimony of the CONSOB President at Parliament Committees
VI "Finanze" and X "AttivitA produttive, commercio e turismo, della Camera and 60
"Finanze e tesoro" and 10' "Industria, commercio e turismo" del Senato, 20th January
(2004)).
44 See Melis, supra note 30, at 8.
45 See Melis, supra note 42.
46 T.U.I.F., supra note 41, at art. 159.
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bookkeeping in its reports or directly to the CONSOB.47 However, in
October 2003 Deloitte & Touche S.p.A. published a review report, related
to the period from January to June 2003, declaring that the firm was unable
to verify the actual value of Parmalat's investment in Epicurum Fund
because no published accounts of the fund were available. The auditing firm
also "rendered a 'non-standard' report declaring that up to 49% of the total
assets of the group and 30% of the consolidated revenues came from
subsidiaries which were audited by other auditors. 48 Deloitte & Touche
S.p.A. admitted that its conclusions were founded solely upon other
auditors' reports, more specifically, upon Grant Thornton S.p.A. reports. In
fact, the mandatory rotation of the external auditing firms was not effective:
Grant Thornton S.p.A. was the external auditing firm of Parmalat S.p.A.
and other off-shore subsidiaries even after 1999.49 Therefore Deloitte &
Touche S.p.A. had been relying on Grant Thornton's work when givin§ its
opinion about Parmalat Finanziaria's consolidated financial statements.
D. Parmalat's Lack of Compliance with the Italian Code of Best Practice -
The "Codice Preda"
In 1999, the managing company of the Italian Stock Exchange, the
Borsa Italiana S.p.A., enacted the so-called "Codice Preda," a code of best
practices for corporate governance of companies listed on the Italian stock
exchanges. This Code was slightly modified in 2002. However, in a civil
law based country such as Italy, the effectiveness of a code of best practices
is limited because of the low enforceability of their recommendations in
comparison with Anglo-Saxon common law based countries. 51 It will be
illustrated whether Parmalat complied, at least on paper, with the
recommended standards of corporate governance in Italy. At the same time,
a thorough examination of the company's organizational system will be
presented in order to show whether the Parmalat organizational structure
offered effective protection of the minority shareholders' rights. In effect,
Parmalat did not comply with the recommended standards of corporate
governance and its organizational structure did not guarantee any protection
to minority shareholders.
47 See Cardia, supra note 43.
48 Melis, supra note 30, at 11 & tbl. 3.
49 Parmalat found a loophole in the law that allowed Grant Thornton S.p.A. to remain as
a "subcontractor."
50 See Melis, supra note 30, at 11 (raising the following policy question: "What is the
point of setting up a mandatory rotation of the chief auditor if the latter relies on the report of
an auditor that has not been forced to rotate?").
51 See Alvaro Cuervo, Corporate Governance Mechanisms: a Plea for Less Code of
Good Governance and More Market Control, 10 CORP. GOVERNANCE - AN INT'L. REV. 84
(2002).
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Paragraph 1.2 of the Codice Preda suggests that only the board of
directors is competent to deal with certain specific issues, including the
examination and approval of the company's strategic, operational, and
financial plans, the approval of the corporate structure of the group, and the
examination and approval of transactions having a significant impact on the
company's profitability, assets and liabilities, or financial position.
5 2
Parmalat Finanziaria, the listed holding company of the group, had
complied with these suggestions since 2001. Paragraph 2.1 of the Codice
Preda recommends that the board of directors shall be composed of
executive directors and non-executive directors, and the number of the non-
executive directors shall be such that their opinions can have significant
54weight in board decisions. Parmalat Finanziaria's board of directors wascomposed of thirteen directors, four of whom, including the Chairman-
52 Paragraph 1.2 of the Codice Preda states that the board of directors shall:
(a) examine and approve the company's strategic, operational and financial plans and the
corporate structure of the group it may head; (b) delegate powers to the managing directors
and to the executive committee and revoke them; it shall specify the limits to such delegated
powers, the manner of exercising them and the frequency, as a general rule not less than once
every three months, with which such bodies must report to the board on the activity
performed in the exercise of the powers delegated to them; (c) determine, after examining the
proposal of the special committee and consulting the board of auditors, the remuneration of
the managing directors and of those directors who are appointed to particular positions within
the company and, where the shareholders' meeting has not already done so, allocate the total
amount to which the members of the board and of the executive committee are entitled; (d)
supervise the general performance of the company, with special reference to situations of
conflict of interest, paying particular attention to the information received from the executive
committee (where established), the managing directors and the internal control committee
and periodically comparing the results achieved with those planned; (e) examine and approve
transactions having a significant impact on the company's profitability, assets and liabilities
or financial position, with special reference to transactions involving related parties; (f) check
the adequacy of the general organisational and administrative structure established by the
managing directors for the company and the group; (g) report to the shareholders at
shareholders' meetings.
I1 Codice di Autodisciplina delle societA quotate rivisitato (Luglio 2002), available at
http://www.borsaitalia.it/old/pdf/en/service/publications/codeofconductrev-pdf.htm (in
English) [hereinafter Codice Preda].
53 See Melis, supra note 30, at 12.
54 Paragraph 2.1 of the Codice Preda establishes that:
The board of directors shall be made up of executive directors (i.e. the managing directors,
including the chairman where he or she has delegated powers, and those directors who
perform management function within the company) and non-executive directors. The number
and standing of the non-executive directors shall be such that their views can carry
significant weight in taking board decisions.
Codice Preda, supra note 52, at para. 2.1.
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CEO, were tied to the Tanzi family.5 5 In its 2003 report on corporate
governance, Parmalat Finanziaria declared that five board members were
non-executive directors.56 An executive committee was then created; it was
composed of seven directors, three of whom were members of the Tanzi
family. 57 Paragraph 3.1 of the Codice Preda recommends that an adequate
number of non-executive directors shall be independent in order to
guarantee the protection of the minority shareholders. 58  Parmalat
Finanziaria declared that three board members were independent directors,
whereas most Italian-listed company boards are composed by five
independent directors. Paragraph 4.3 of the Codice Preda suggests that
"chairmen and the managing directors each have their own tasks,"59
implicitly stating that a non-executive director should be appointed as• 60
Chairman. It was empirically proven that in most of the MIB30 listed
companies, those two positions are disjointed.6' At Parmalat Finanziaria,
the two positions of Chairman and CEO were held by the same person,
55 See Melis, supra note 30, at 12.
56 Id. at 13 & tbl. 4 (highlighting that the fact that non-executive directors are less than
executive directors is quite unusual among Italian listed companies).
57 See id. (observing that eight of the Parmalat Finanziaria directors, including all the
members of the executive committee and one non-executive director were also sitting at the
board of directors of Parmalat S.p.A.).
58 Paragraph 3.1 of the Codice Preda indicates that:
An adequate number of non-executive directors shall be independent, in the sense that they:
(a) do not entertain, directly or indirectly or on behalf of third parties, nor have recently
entertained business relationships with the company, its subsidiaries, the executive directors
or the shareholder or group of shareholders who controls the company of a significance able
to influence their autonomy judgment; (b) neither own, directly or indirectly or on behalf of
third parties, a quantity of shares enabling them to control the company or exercise a
considerable influence over it nor participate in shareholders' agreements to control the
company; (c ) are not immediate family members of executive directors of the company or of
persons in the situation referred to in points (a) and (b).
Codice Preda, supra note 52, at para. 3.1.
59 Id. at para. 4.3.
60 The paragraph, however, notes that "it is not infrequent in Italy for the same person to
hold the two positions or for some management powers to be delegated to the chairman even
where there are managing directors." Id. The paragraph also makes clear that:
the board of directors, where it deems this to be desirable in order to achieve a more efficient
running of the company, has the right to delegate management powers to the chairman alone
or with others. In such case the board should include adequate information in its annual report
on the duties and responsibilities of the chairman and the managing directors.
Id.
61 See Melis, supra note 30, at 17 & tbl. 5 (noting also that even when the positions are
disjointed, the separation of the two roles of Chairman and CEO is often not adequately clear
since the Chairman is often given some executive powers).
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Calisto Tanzi, the major shareholder of the company. This is an example of
a situation where an extremely significant amount of power was in the
hands of a single person. However, the company did comply with the
Codice Preda. In fact, paragraph 5 states that the executive committee and
the managing directors shall periodically inform the board of directors of
the activities performed in the exercise of their delegated powers;
62
Parmalat Finanziaria created this report quarterly. 63 Paragraph 6.1 of the
Codice Preda states that the managing directors shall ensure the correct
handling of confidential information, and to do so they shall propose to the
board of directors the adoption of specific internal procedures for the
handling and disclosure of information about the company.6 4 Parmalat
Finanziaria adopted internal procedures in 2002, creating a structured
system under the responsibility and control of Chairman and CEO Tanzi,
65thereby formally complying with the code of best practices. However,
these procedures and structure were just an artful way of covering the
66
accounting fraud for more than ten years.
The appointment of directors is regulated by paragraph 7.1 of the
Codice Preda,67 which gives listed companies the option of establishing a
62 Paragraph 5 of the Codice Preda states that:
The executive committee-in the person of its chairman-and the managing directors shall
periodically report to the board of directors on the activities performed in the exercise of their
delegated powers. The bodies with delegated powers shall also provide adequate information
on transactions that are atypical, unusual or with related parties whose examination and
approval are not reserved to the board of directors. They shall provide the board of directors
and the board of auditors with the same information.
Codice Preda, supra note 52, at para. 5.
63 See Melis, supra note 30, at 15 (pointing out that the separation between C.E.O. and
Chairman is recommended by most of the international corporate governance codes of best
practice).
64 Paragraph 6.1 of the Codice Preda states that:
The managing directors shall ensure the correct handling of confidential information; to this
end they shall propose to the board of directors the adoption of internal procedures for the
internal handling and disclosure to third parties of informative concerning the company, with
special reference to price-sensitive information and information concerning transactions
involving financial instruments carried out by persons whose positions give them access to
relevant information.
Codice Preda, supra note 52, at para. 6.1.
65 See Anna Clara Cavallari et al., Corporate Governance in the Italian Listed Companies
(2003), http://www.borsaitalia.it (reporting that the great majority of the Italian listed
companies analyzed complied with this provision).
66 See Melis, supra note 30, at 18.
67 Paragraph 7.1 of the Codice Preda establishes that:
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nomination committee to propose candidates for appointment to the
position of director, especially where the board sees that it is difficult for
shareholders to make proposals, as may be the case in listed companies with
a broad shareholder base.68 Parmalat Finanziaria did not comply with this
suggestion and justified that choice by making clear that shareholders never
faced any difficulty in making proposals for candidates. 9
Paragraph 8 of the Codice Preda 70 recommends that the board of
directors shall create a committee on remuneration, the majority of whose
members shall be non-executive directors.71 Parmalat Finanziaria had a
remuneration committee of three members, two of whom were non-
executive directors.
Paragraph 10 of the Codice Preda 72 suggests that the board of directors
Proposals for appointment to the position of director, accompanied by detailed information
on the personal traits and professional qualifications of the candidates with an indication
where appropriate of their eligibility to qualify as independent directors as defined in Article
3, shall be deposited at the company's registered office at least 10 days before the date fixed
for the shareholders' meeting or at the time the election lists, if provided for, are deposited.
Codice Preda, supra note 52, at para. 7.1.
68 See Cavallari, supra note 65.
69 See Melis, supra note 30, at 16 (noting that this may be deemed a reasonable
explanation considering the high level of concentrated control in the structure of the
company).
70 Paragraph 8. 1 of the Codice Preda states that:
The board of directors shall form a committee on remuneration and stock option or equity
based remuneration plans. The committee, the majority of whose members shall be non-
executive directors, shall submit proposals to the board, in the absence of the person directly
concerned, for the remuneration of the managing directors and of those directors who are
appointed to particular positions and, acting on a proposal from the managing directors, for
the criteria to be used in determining the remuneration of the company's top management. To
this end the committee may employ external consulents at the company's expense.
Codice Preda, supra note 52, at para. 8.1.
71 See Cavallari, supra note 65 (reporting that more than 80% of the companies formed a
remuneration committee, and that 95% of those companies have committees mostly
composed by non-executive directors).
72 Paragraph 10.1 of the Codice Preda establishes that:
The board of directors shall establish an internal control committee, charged with the task of
giving advice and making proposals and made up of non-executive directors, of which the
majority shall be independent. The chairman of the board of auditors or another auditor
appointed by the same shall participate in the committee's meetings.
Codice Preda, supra note 52, at para. 10.1. Paragraph 10.2 states that:
In particular the internal control committee shall: (a) assist the board in performing the tasks
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establish an internal committee of non-executive directors, the majority of
whom shall be independent, to give advice and make proposals. The
internal control committee assists the board in performing the internal
control system, supervises the activity of the persons responsible for
internal controls, evaluates the appropriateness of the accounting standards
adopted, and informs the board of directors of its activity and the adequacy
of the internal control system at least once every six months.73 The Parmalat
Finanziaria internal control committee was composed of three members,
two of whom were also members of the executive committee. Therefore,
contrary to the Codice Preda recommendation, non-executive directors were
not the majority of the committee. Moreover, one of the internal control
committee members, Fausto Tonna, had been the chief finance director
from 1987 to March 2003 and was also the chairman of Coloniale S.p.A.,
the Tanzi family holding company and the major shareholder of Parmalat
Finanziaria. The chairman of the committee was deemed to be an
independent director. Nevertheless, he was "the chartered certified
accountant of the Tanzi family (as well as an old personal friend of Calisto
Tanzi).,, 74 It is clear that none of the members of the internal control
committee could have been deemed independent. Finally, Parmalat
Finanziaria did not comply at all with the recommendation in paragraph 3.2
of the Codice Preda,7 5 which suggests that when ownership is concentrated,
some directors shall be independent from the controlling shareholder in
order to allow the board to verify that potential conflicts of interest between
referred to in Article 9.2; (b) assess the work program prepared by the persons responsible
for internal control and receive their periodic reports; (c) assess, together with the heads of
administration and the external auditors, the appropriateness of the accounting standards
adopted and, in the case of groups, their uniformity with a view to the preparation of the
consolidated accounts; (d) assess the proposals put forward by auditing firms to obtain the
audit engagement, the work program for carrying out the audit and the results thereof as set
out in the auditor's report and their letter of suggestions; (e) report to the board of directors
on its activity and the adequacy of the internal control system at least once every six months,
at the time the annual and semi-annual accounts are approved; (f) perform the other duties
entrusted to it by the board of directors, particularly as regards relations with the auditing
firm.
Codice Preda, supra note 52, at para. 10.2.
73 See Cavallari, supra note 65 (reporting that almost 90% of the Italian companies
analyzed adopted an internal control committee, and that over 82% of those companies'
internal control committees are composed by of non-executive directors, who almost always
are independent).
74 Melis, supra note 30, at 21 (pointing out that this showing is based on data not
provided by the company and also concluding that the relationship between the Chairman of
the committee and Mr. Tanzi clearly affected the former autonomous judgment in the
committee).
75 Id. (noting that Parmalat Finanziaria did not give an adequate explanation for not
complying with the recommendation).
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the company and the controlling shareholders are subject to an adequate,
independent judgment.76
Paragraph 11.1 of the Codice Preda recommends that transactions with
related parties shall comply with criteria of substantial and procedural
fairness. 7 Even though Paramalat Finanziaria alleged that a procedure to
deal with these kinds of transactions was created and therefore the company
had complied with the recommendation, such transactions were not handled
following the criteria of substantial and procedural fairness.78 In paragraph
12, the Codice Preda79 recommends that the board of directors shall
designate a person or create a corporate structure to be responsible for
relations with institutional investors and other shareholders. Parmalat
Finanziaria alleged that this recommended structure was created in 2001 .8
The analysis of the company's structure and compliance with the
Codice Preda clearly shows that Parmalat Finanziaria was under the tight
control of a strong blockholder, the Tanzi family, and that the minority
shareholders did not actively participate in the company's decisions or have
adequate protection. This point is underscored by the remarkable number of
directors tied to members of the Tanzi family (four out of thirteen on the
board of directors and three out of seven on the executive committee), the
fact that only three of the non-executive directors were independent, and the
fact that the positions of Chairman and CEO were both held by Calisto
Tanzi. The analysis further illustrates that minority shareholders did not
have the means to exercise any control over the internal procedures used to
76 Paragraph 3.2 of the Codice Preda states that:
[W]here the ownership is concentrated, or a controlling group of shareholders can be
identified, the problem of aligning the interests of the managing directors with those of the
shareholders continues to exist, but there emerges the need for some directors to be
independent from the controlling shareholders too, so as to allow the board to verify that
potential conflicts of interest between the interests of the company and those of the
controlling shareholders are assessed with adequate independence ofjudgment.
Codice Preda, supra note 52, at para. 3.2.77 Id. at para. 11.1.
78 See Melis, supra note 30, at 22.
79 Paragraph 12 of the Codice Preda establishes that:
The chairman of the board of directors and the managing directors shall, while complying
with the procedure for the disclosure of documents and information concerning the company,
actively endeavor to develop a dialogue with shareholders and institutional investors based n
recognition of their reciprocal roles. They shall designate a person or, where appropriate,
create a corporate structure to be responsible for this function.
Codice Preda, supra note 52, at para. 12.
80 See Melis, supra note 30, at 22.
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disclose information or over the activities of the company. In fact, the
system of disclosing information to third parties was controlled by
Chairman and CEO Tanzi, a nomination committee to propose candidates
for appointment to the position of director was never established, and none
of the members of the internal committee could have been deemed
independent. The minority shareholders were practically excluded from any
activity in the company and Parmalat Finanziaria was organized and
structured to remain under the exclusive control of the majority stockholder
in order to cover the perpetrated accounting fraud.
E. Remedies Available to Minority Shareholders in Italy
Unofficial data estimates that more than 100,000 Italian investors
bought Parmalat stock. 81 After the fraud was exposed, these investors' main
goal was to obtain compensation for their damages. They have been
assisted by many consumer advocate associations. Among the investors
(both shareholders and bonds owners), shareholders are the least likely to
recover any part of their investment. In fact, the Parmalat restructuring plan,
led by Enrico Bondi, must first try to satisfy all the company's creditors,
bond owners included. Only after the creditors are fully paid, and if any
assets remain, can the company pay any money to satisfy the shareholders. 
2
Given the financial situation of Parmalat, this is not likely to happen.
However, if the shareholders were aware of the true financial condition of
Parmalat, it is unlikely they would have purchased any shares. It is clear
that the shareholders were damaged by the fraudulent behavior of the
Parmalat majority owners and managers.
The criminal trial for fraud against Calisto Tanzi and his managers
commenced after the preliminary inquiries started in September 2005.
Some shareholders have decided to become parties to the trial in the hopes
of being able to recover compensation. Others are still undecided on
whether to join the litigation, even though consumer associations are
offering legal aid at reasonable rates. The main reason for their indecision is
that being a party to this trial before the criminal court does not guarantee
civil compensation.
On the one hand, it will be a fairly easy matter to prove that Mr. Tanzi
and his managers were guilty (the prosecutors have the power to request
discovery and are carrying out an investigation). On the other hand, it is
absurd to hope that the criminal defendants will be able to repay all the
damages they have caused. Therefore, the shareholders' attorneys will
81 See Tony Barber, Italian plan to compensate investors for their losses, FIN. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2005, at 10.
82 It must be noticed that the restructuring plan offers the bond owners the chance to
become shareholders of the "new Parmalat."
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likely try to file suits against the banks and the investment firms involved in
the sale of Parmalat's shares. At present, only the Italian affiliates of Bank
of America, Deloitte & Touche, and Grant Thornton have been named as
defendants in the trial. It is clear, though, that shareholders who have
decided to join this action with the prosecutor are not likely to recover
damages. Nevertheless, the legal expenses associated with this kind of
action are not onerous, leading some shareholders to believe that it could be
worth trying.
Until now, almost none of Parmalat's shareholders have chosen to file
civil claims for damages against Tanzi and his management. The reasons
are straightforward. First, the legal expenses for civil cases are much larger
than those for criminal proceedings. Second, Italian rules of civil procedure
do not contemplate class actions. This means that each shareholder must
file her own claim and bear the legal expenses alone. In addition, Italian law
forbids contingency fees. Thus, the shareholder must pay the expenses of
litigation in advance and would recover such expenses only in the case of a
final victory8 3 Third, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. As a
consequence, a shareholder in a claim against Parmalat must provide
evidence of the fraud perpetrated and of the correlation between the fraud
and the damages she allegedly suffered. It is quite clear that the difficulty of
sustaining the burden of proof is significantly higher for an individual
shareholder. This is even more difficult considering the "asymmetry of
information" regarding a company's business and financial operations, and
the bookkeeping typically existing between the company's management
and the shareholders. Last, but not least, the average duration of lawsuits in
Italy is almost twice that of lawsuits in most other EU countries.8 4 This
combination of factors provides neither a strong incentive to file a claim nor
an effective legal device to obtain a quick recovery of damages.
III. PROTECTION OF LISTED COMPANY MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS IN THE ITALIAN SYSTEM OF CORPORATE LAW
A. The Legal Sources of Italian Corporate Law
The principal source of Italian corporate law is articles 2060 to 2642 of
83 The legal expenses are determined by the judge and must be paid by the losing party.
However, the amount of the expenses can be different, and even lower, than the amount paid
in advance by the parties.
84 See Marco Ventoruzzo, Experiments in Comparative Law: the Recent Italian Reform
and the Dubious Virtues of a Market for Rules in the Absence of Effective Regulatory
Competition, fig. 43 (2004), available at http://www.ssrn.com, (indicating that in Italy the
average number of months for first degree judgment amounts to 36 and for final judgment to
116).
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the 1942 Civil Code. 85 Articles 2325 to 2497-bis deal specifically with
types of corporations: the "societA per azioni" (stock company), the "societA
in accomandita per azioni" (stock company with personally liable
directors), and the "societA a responsabilitA limitata" (limited liability
company). The legislative model is the "societA per azioni." Each type of
corporate legal structure was conceived for organizations with different
needs. In particular, the "societd per azioni" was designed as an
organizational form for medium to large businesses. 86 The corporate law
section of the Civil Code, unlike its other parts, has been amended several
times. The most significant change since the Civil Code was enacted came
in 2003 with the Legislative Decree 17.01.2003, n. 6, that determined the
so-called "Reform of Italian Corporate Law." At present, the Civil Code is
supplemented by a number of laws dealing with particular areas, the most
important of which, for the purpose of this paper, is the Legislative Decree
24.02.1998 n. 58-the so-called "Testo Unico dell'Intermediazione
Finanziaria" ("T.U.I.F.")-enacted in 1998 and regulating, among other
aspects, the self-monitoring of listed companies. In addition, the "Codice
Preda" was enacted in 1999 and modified in 2002. Finally, the updated
interpretation and application of the articles of the Civil Code and of the
supplementary laws are determined by the judgments passed by the "Corte
di Cassazione" the Italian Supreme Court.
The Civil Code and the T.U.I.F., though, are the main sources of the
listed companies' minority shareholder rights. Shareholders have the right
to participate in shareholders' meetings 87 and minority shareholders owning
not less than 10% of the company's capital can call such meetings. 88 At
these meetings, the shareholders can approve the final budget, appoint and
revoke directors, appoint internal auditors and the President of the Board of
Auditors, decide the compensation for directors and internal auditors, and
make decisions on the liability of directors and internal auditors. 89 Article
2393-bis of the Civil Code allows minority shareholders owning not less
than 5% of the outstanding shares to bring a derivative action against
directors for liability toward the company. Shareholders can also file a
complaint with the Board of Auditors concerning facts they deem
censurable, and the board shall take the complaint into account in its report
85 There are some provisions included in other parts of the Civil Code. For example,
article 320, in which the fifth paragraph deals with the business activity of underage
children, is in the family law section.
86 See Lorenzo Stanghellini, Corporate Governance in Italy: Strong Owners, Faithful
Managers. An Assessment and a Proposal for Reform, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 91
(1995).
87 Codice Civile arts. 2364, 2364-bis, 2365 (It.) [hereinafter C.c.].
88 Id. at art. 2367.
89 Id. at art. 2364.
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at the meeting. 90 The Board of Auditors has a duty to investigate the facts
set forth in the complaint when it is submitted by a group of members
representing one-fiftieth of the company's capital.9 If there is a basis for
suspicion of serious irregularities in management by the directors in
violation of their duties, Article 2409 of the Civil Code empowers the
shareholders representing one-twentieth of the company's capital to report
the facts to the court. Article 2497 of the Civil Code states that a holding
company, or its controlling shareholder, can be held liable to minority
shareholders if the company caused damage through mismanagement of the
controlled companies. Finally, all shareholders have the right to inspect the
company's books92 and the right of withdrawal.
93
B. The Recent Reform of Italian Corporate Law
1. Overview
The Reform of Italian Corporate Law, enacted by the Legislative
Decree 17.01.2003, was inspired primarily by the need to simplify the
procedure to incorporate and organize a stock company and a limited
liability company. For the purpose of this article, attention will be focused
on significant innovations provided by the Reform relative to the structure
of the corporate governance of a stock company. Shareholders can now
choose among three different governance systems: the traditional system,
the dualistic system, and the monistic system.
94
The traditional system is characterized by the presence of a board of
directors having the power to manage the company and composed of
members elected at the shareholders' meeting. It also provides for a board
of auditors, composed of members elected at the shareholders' meeting,
which must ensure that the company respects the law and the charter, and
the adequacy of the organizational, administrative, and accounting
structure. One of the most significant innovations of the Reform, even for
the traditional system, is that accounting control of the company is no
longer in the hands of the Board of Auditors, but is now a duty of an
external auditing firm, elected at the shareholders' meeting.
In the dualistic system, management is carried out by a management
board, the "Consiglio di Gestione," whereas control of the company is
exercised by a Supervisory Board, the "Consiglio di Sorveglianza." The
management board has the power to manage the company and must operate
" Id. at art. 2408
91 C.c., supra note 87, at art. 2408.
92 Id. at art. 2422.
93 Id. at art. 2347; T. U.I.F, supra note 41, at art. 131.
94 C.c., supra note 87, at arts. 2325-2409.
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to reach corporate objectives; its members are elected by the supervisory
board. This board, whose members are elected by the shareholders at the
shareholders' meeting, approves the balance sheet for the fiscal year
(practically replacing the shareholders' meeting), supervises compliance
with laws and the charter, ensures conformity with the principles of proper
management and the adequacy of the organization, and manages the
administrative and accounting structure adopted by the company.
In the monistic system, the responsibility of managing the company
belongs exclusively to a board of directors, elected at the shareholders'
meeting. The controlling activity is exercised by a committee established
within the board of directors, called the Committee for the Control of
Management. The members of this committee are elected by the board of
directors, and at least one of the members must be chosen among those
registered with examiners of accounts. Both in the dualistic system and in
the monistic system (and also in the traditional system, as mentioned above)
the accounting control of the company is exercised by an auditor or by an
auditing company registered with the Ministry of Justice. For listed
companies, the accounting control is exercised by an auditing company
registered with examiners of accounts which, exclusively for such activities,
is subject to both the discipline of the auditing activity contemplated for
companies listed on the stock exchange and to the supervision of the
National Stock Exchange Committee. It is clear that the Reform
significantly increased the contractual freedom offered to shareholders
organizing and structuring a company.
Two other important innovations characterize the Reform. The first is
the introduction of the shareholders' derivative action against directors
under article 2393-bis of the Civil Code.95 The second is the enactment of
article 2497 of the Civil Code, which allows minority shareholders of a
holding company to sue the company in case of damage caused by
mismanagement of the controlled companies.9 6
2. Broadened Contractual Freedom and the Necessity to Reinforce
Protection for Minority Shareholders
As described above, the reform of Italian corporate law clearly offers
shareholders broad contractual freedom in the organization of the
management and control structure of a company. At the same time, the
reform introduces certain new instruments to increase the protection of
minority shareholders. These instruments are specifically designed to
counterbalance such broad contractual freedom. The premise for these
protections is that "broadened contractual freedom combined with the
95 C.c., supra note 87, at art. 2393.
96 C.c., supra note 87, at art. 2497.
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existence of strong controlling shareholders, as well as the more extensive
powers granted to directors appointed by the controlling shareholders,
might easily result in oppression and exploitation of minorities unless they
are granted effective counter-mechanisms. 97 Withdrawal rights, derivative
suits against directors, and the new regulation for groups of corporations are
the three main areas of minority shareholders' rights affected by the
innovations brought about by the Reform. Section IV will thoroughly
illustrate these aspects.
C. Instruments Offered by Italian Corporate Law to Protect Minority
Shareholders
1. The Shareholders' Meeting
The shareholders' meeting must be held at least once a year. The role
of the annual meeting of the shareholders differs depending upon whether
the company has a Supervisory Board or not.
Article 2364 of the Civil Code indicates the role of the shareholders in
the meeting of a company without a Supervisory Council. The shareholders
can approve the final budget, appoint and revoke directors, appoint internal
auditors and the president of the Board of Auditors, decide the
compensation for directors and internal auditors, if it is not established in
the charter, and make a decision on the liability of directors and internal
auditors.
Article 2364-bis of the Civil Code indicates the role of the
shareholders in the meeting of a company with a Supervisory Council. The
powers of the shareholders in this case are significantly less and far more
limited. In fact, the shareholders can only appoint and revoke the members
of the Supervisory Council, decide the council member's compensation, if
not established in the charter, and make a decision on the liability of
members of the Supervisory Council. The approval of the final budget, as
well as the appointment and revocation of the directors, are under the power
of the Supervisory Council. This situation leaves the management of the
company almost entirely under the control of the Supervisory Council and,
therefore, practically excludes the shareholders. This rule has an exception.
When the final budget is not approved or when there is a request from at
least 1/3 of the members of the Supervisory Council, the charter may give
the shareholders power to approve the final budget. 98 However,
shareholders are expressly prohibited from requesting that the approval of
the final budget be shifted from the Supervisory Council to the
shareholders' meeting. In all companies, regardless of whether there is a
97 Ventoruzzo, supra note 84, at 35.
98 C.c., supra note 87, at art. 2364-bis.
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Supervisory Council, it is clear that minority shareholders have quite
limited control of the management of the company, as there is no discussion
about it; the law itself determines it.
Article 2365 of the Civil Code determines the purpose of the special
meeting of the shareholders. Two of the most relevant purposes are that the
shareholders can decide to amend the charter and the shareholders can
decide on any matter on which they are specifically given the power to
decide by law (e.g., mergers, decreasing the equity capital of the company,
etc.). In the case of a company with a Supervisory Board, the charter may
establish that the Supervisory Board has the power to decide on mergers,
decrease of the equity capital, and removal of the headquarters of the
company.
The directors usually call the shareholders' meeting at least once a
year. Directors must also call a meeting when the following specific
situations occur: lack of the majority of the directors, a decrease of more
than 30% of the authorized capital caused by losses, or the occurrence of an
event that determines the dissolution of the company (e.g., a decrease of the
authorized capital under the minimum amount of E 100,000-established by
article 2327 of the Civil Code). The decision to call a meeting for other
reasons is at the discretion of the directors. However, not calling a meeting
when it is clearly appropriate can be considered a breach of the duty of care
for which the directors can be held liable.99 Nevertheless, article 2367 of the
Civil Code also establishes that the minority shareholders can ask that a
meeting be called. In fact, directors or the Management Board must
immediately call a shareholders' meeting when the request comes from a
shareholder (or a group of shareholders) owning not less than the 10% of
the company's capital or the percentage indicated in the charter. If the
directors do not immediately call the meeting and the refusal to do so is
clearly unjustified, a court can order that the meeting be called. A court
cannot order the calling of the meeting when refusal by the directors
appears to be justified, i.e., when the directors can prove to the court that
the shareholders' request for the meeting abuses the right that article 2367
gives them. This often happens when the minority shareholders present
recurring requests, indicating a clear abuse of the right established by article
2367.100 However, this rule does not apply for those matters in which the
99 Article 2409 of the Civil Code empowers a shareholder or a group of shareholders
owning not less than the 20% of the authorized capital to denounce the directors before the
Court in the case there is a well-founded belief that the directors committed grave
irregularity in managing the company and, therefore, this behavior could have damaged the
company.
100 See Carota, Societti per azioni e convocazioni dell'assemblea su richiesta della
minoranza, in Contratto e impresa, at 849 (1989); see also Martines, Abuso del diritto: la
chicane del socio di minoranza, in Contratto e impresa, at 28 (1998).
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calling of the meeting is at the exclusive discretion of the directors, i.e.,
decisions about a merger with another company or about an increase of the
authorized capital.
A decision made at the shareholders' meeting can be voided. A
decision is void only in the cases established by article 2379 of the Civil
Code.1° 1 Otherwise, the decision is voidable in every other case in which
the decision was against the law or against the provisions in the charter.
0 2
The action to have the decision voided can be initiated by the directors,
Supervisory Council, auditors, or shareholders who did not attend the
meeting, voted against the decision or did not vote at all. To file the suit to
have the decision declared void a shareholder (or a group of shareholders)
must own voting shares representing not less than 1/1000 of the company's
capital. 10 3 However, the shareholders have an alternative remedy if they do
not own the minimum number of shares indicated above. In fact, the
shareholders can file a suit against the company for damages suffered
because of an invalid decision. Both the action to have the decision declared
void and the action for damages must be filed within 90 days of the date of
the decision. The Court must judge only the legitimacy of the decision; any
judgment about the substance of them is definitively excluded. 10 4 However,
there can be a judgment about the substance when it is necessary to
ascertain whether the decision lacks legitimacy. The Court can declare void
a decision that any reasonable person could deem to be disadvantageous to
the company. 10 5 The presumption is that the majority of the shareholders
abused their power by using their prominent position in order to achieve
personal benefits to the detriment of the other shareholders and of the
company itself. Thus, again the Court must ascertain only the legitimacy of
the decision; there is no question about the economic reasons that pushed
the majority to vote in a certain way, but there is a strong attempt to prevent
them from abusing their voting rights to the detriment of the company.1
0 6
101 The action to have the decision confirmed void can be brought up by anybody who
has an interest in it, and also the voidness can be directly declared by the judge without any
claim.
102 C.c., supra note 87, at art. 2377.
103 Id.
04 The jurisprudence is in total agreement on this point: see Cass. Civ., 30 oct. 1970,
n.2263, Rivista di diritto commerciale 1970, II, 398; Cass. Civ., 4 mar. 1963, n.5 11, Foro It.
1963, I, c.684.
05 See Trib. di Milano, 6 oct. 1986, SocietA 1987, 384; Trib. di Milano, 22 mar. 1982,
Foro It. 1982, I, c.2636.
106 ALDO MAISANO, L'ECCESSO DI POTERE NELLE DELIBERAZIONI ASSEMBLEARI DI
SOCIETA PER AZIONI (1968).
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2. Shareholders' Derivative Suits
The directors are responsible for their actions towards the company,
the creditors of the company, and the shareholders. Article 2392 of the Civil
Code establishes that the directors must fulfill the duties imposed by the
law or the charter with the care required by the nature of the task and
through their specific expertise. Besides the duty of care, directors must act
with prudence and ability. The former requires the duty of not executing
hazardous operations that a prudent entrepreneur would never undertake.
The latter focuses on the capability of managing a company and on the
necessary knowledge a director must possess in order to make the right
decisions for the company.
10
7
Article 2392 of the Civil Code also prescribes that directors shall fulfill
the duties imposed upon them by law and by the charter with the diligence
required by the nature of the appointment and by their specific
competencies. It also prescribes that the directors are liable in solido to the
company for damages deriving from the non-observance of such duties
(duty of care and duty of loyalty). The directors' liable behavior is deemed
to be a violation of the provisions comprised in the charter.' 
08
The general rule under Italian law is that a suit seeking to hold
directors liable must be approved by the shareholders' meeting, i.e., by the
controlling shareholder or shareholders.10 9 Therefore a conflict of interest
could arise when, as commonly happens, controlling shareholders are the
ones who appointed those directors. Consequently, "directors are rarely
sued unless the corporation goes bankrupt, in which case the trustee in
bankruptcy might sue them if he or she believes that they damaged the
corporation or the creditors with their negligence. Obviously, in this
situation minority shareholders have little protection or recourse against
directors' misconduct."" 0 This problem occurred in 1998, when derivative
actions by minority shareholders of listed companies were introduced
through the enactment of the T.U.I.F. In fact, article 129 of the T.U.I.F.
establishes that minority shareholders, on behalf of the company, can bring
a suit against directors for liability towards the company. Minority
shareholders who want to sue directors must represent not less than 5% of
the outstanding shares and must also have held the shares for the last six
107 See GUSTAVO MINERVINI, GLi AMMINISTRATORI DI SOCIETA PER AZIONI, Milano 184
(1956); GIANCARLO FRE, SOCIETA PER AZIONI, COMMENTARIO DEL CODICE CIVILE, 503
(1982); ROBERTO WEIGMANN, RESPONSABILITA E POTERE LEGITTIMO 357 (1974); Massimo
Franzoni, Gli Amministratori ed i Sindaci, LE SOCIETA, Torino, at 301 (2002).
108 Cass. Civ., 06 oct. 1981, n.5241, Giur. Commentata 1982, II, 768; see also FRANCO
BONELLI, LA RESPONSABILITA DEGLI AMMINISTRATORI DI SOCIETA PER AZIONI (1992).
109 See Ventoruzzo, supra note 84, at 40.
110 Id.
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months.11" ' In these types of suits, the shareholders can claim that the
directors breached the duty of care or loyalty and seek damages suffered by
the company (even though the action is taken by the minority, only the
company benefits from it; in fact, in this case, the directors can be held
liable exclusively to the company).' 2 The company can renounce or settle
the case through a shareholders' meeting resolution, provided that 5% of
the shareholders do not oppose it. The rationale for this rule is that "in case
of victory, the damages recovered by the corporation will increase the value
of the participation of shareholders, and that increase in value might justify
the cost of undertaking the litigation."
'" 13
The 2003 Reform introduced the new Article 2393-bis of the Civil
Code. The Article allows both the shareholders' meeting and minority
shareholders (owning not less than 5% of the outstanding shares) to bring a
derivative action against directors for liability towards the company and is
applicable both to listed and non-listed companies. The Italian Supreme
Court recognized that failure or irregularity in bookkeeping by the directors,
as is alleged in the Parmalat case, must be considered an illicit behavior that
could potentially damage the company and therefore justify a claim for
damages compensation under article 2392 of the Civil Code." 
4
The experience of listed companies after 1998 demonstrates that, even
with the 5% threshold for the minority shareholders' derivative suit, this
instrument was never used.' 15 This lack of use can be easily explained. First
and foremost, the economic incentives for minority shareholders to bring a
lawsuit are relatively low. To bring a suit, they would have to advance the
expenses of the litigation, which could be recovered only in case of victory
and, even if this is the case, not necessarily in their entirety. The minority
shareholder, therefore, bears a rather substantial risk of loss. Second, in the
event of victory, only the corporation gets reimbursed. While it is true, as a
theoretical matter, that the cash flow obtained by the corporation increases
the value of shareholders' participation, this effect is inevitably diluted,
particularly since the shareholder holds a minority interest. Moreover, the
very fact that a lawsuit is pending against current or former directors might
itself adversely affect the value of the participation. It is not surprising,
therefore, that in listed corporations shareholders prefer simply to exit the
111 Id. at 41 (stating that the "rule is designed to prevent speculation on shares for the
purpose of bringing a strike suit against the corporation"; noting also that the charters of
listed companies can establish a lower threshold of possession of shares required to bring a
suit against directors, which would allow even smaller minorities to use this device, but that
no listed companies has ever used this device).
112 See Francesco Galgano & Riccardo Genghini, II nuovo diritto societario, Tomo
Primo, Padova, 289 (2004).
113 Ventoruzzo, supra note 84, at 41.
114 Cass. Civ., 19 dec. 1985, n.6493, Giur. Commentata 1986, 812.
115 See Ventoruzzo, supra note 84, at 41.
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corporation and sell their shares on the market, rather than to engage the
directors in a costly, uncertain, and potentially protracted litigation. In
addition, Italian rules of civil procedure and professional regulation of
attorneys do not provide for instruments that might encourage the use of
such derivative actions. Under Italian law, in fact, there are no set rules
concerning class actions, although some proposed legislation is currently
being considered by the legislature. Contingency fees are forbidden, and
there is nothing comparable to U.S.-style extensive, party-controlled
"discovery." As a consequence, in any derivative action minority
shareholders are at a significant disadvantage in terms of information in
relation to the director-defendants, who have better access to the relevant
information and therefore can more easily defend against allegations of
misconduct, i.e., the so-called "information asymmetry." Finally, the
average length of a civil lawsuit in Italy seriously discourages resorting to
the courthouse as a means of protecting minority shareholders. However,
even with respect to this instrument for protection of minorities, the 2003
Reform grants significant freedom of contract. Specifically, the charter can
raise the threshold of shares that is necessary to bring a derivative lawsuit
up to 1/3 of outstanding capital, 1 6 therefore making it more difficult for
minorities to meet the necessary prerequisite. Once again, the level of
protection for minorities, in this case the cause of action that might be used
to react to breach of fiduciary duties of directors appointed by the majority,
is in great part left to the majority itself. As a consequence, while from any
perspective this "Italian-style" derivative action seems like a relatively
feeble instrument in comparison with its American counterpart, its
effectiveness can be further reduced through by-laws.
Article 2395 of the Civil Code establishes that the provisions of the
preceding articles regarding the responsibility of the directors towards the
company and the creditors of the company do not affect the right to
compensation for damages of an individual shareholder who has been
directly injured as a result of malice, fraud, or negligence of the directors.
The shareholder can bring a suit against the directors to be compensated for
damages. This right, though, is granted only to the shareholder who has
been directly injured by the directors (for instance, when the shareholder
has been illegitimately excluded from a share of the profits). It is not
granted to the shareholder who has been indirectly injured, e.g., when the
directors damaged the company and therefore only indirectly affected the
shareholder's personal stake (in this case the only way to hold directors
liable would be an action against the company under article 2392 of the
Civil Code). 1 7 Article 2395 of the Civil Code constitutes an integration of
116 C.c., supra note 87, at art. 2393-bis.
17 Cass. Civ., 07 sept. 1993, n.938, Massimario del Foro It. 1993; Cass. Civ., 14 feb.
1966, n.441, Giur. Civ. 1966, 1,450.
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the general discipline regulating liability in the Civil Code (articles 2043 to
2059).118 The integration is manifested when the directors have directly
caused an injury, through negligence or fraud. The duty of compensation, in
addition to the company, weighs on the directors who acted negligently
and/or fraudulently. The action must be brought within five years (starting
from the date of the action that damaged the shareholder)." 9 Both the
company and the directors can be held liable. However, article 6 of the
Legislative Decree 08.06.2001, n. 231 allows a company to avoid this
liability. To avoid liability, first, the company must prove that its
organization and management was structured to avoid and prevent such
illicit actions before the liable behavior has been committed by the director.
Second, the director must have evaded the model of the organization and
deceived the company's management. In strict correlation with this
provision, article 2381, section 3 of the Civil Code imposes on the Board of
Directors the obligation to evaluate whether or not the company has an. ... .. 120
adequate organizational, administrative, and accounting structure.
3. Shareholders' Rights Related to the Board of Statutory Auditors
The board of auditors, in the traditional model of the Italian societd per
azioni, is composed of three or five members and is elected by the meeting
of the shareholders. The board of auditors has the duty to control the
lawfulness and efficiency of the company; more specifically, to supervise
the observance of the law and the by-laws, and comply with the principles
of proper management. In particular, the board of auditors has the power to
supervise the adequacy of the organization and the administrative and
accounting structure adopted by the company and its functioning (article
2403 of the Civil Code).
Article 2407 of the Civil Code establishes that the auditors shall fulfill
their duties with the professionalism and diligence required by the nature of
the appointment; they are liable for the truth of their statements, and shall
keep secret the facts and documents of which they have knowledge by
reason of their office. Auditors are liable both to the company and the
creditors of the company for the correct fulfillment of their duties. Auditors
are also liable in solido with the directors for acts and omissions of the
latter, when the injury would not have occurred if they had exercised
vigilance in conformity with the duties of their office.
Auditors of listed companies have further duties and powers. Article
149 of the T.U.I.F. requires them to immediately inform the CONSOB
118 Cass. Civ., 23 mar. 1961, n.698, Massimario del Foro It. 1961; Cass. Civ., 03 dec.
2002, n.17110, Foro It. 2003, 1, c. 2348.
119 C.c., supra note 87, at art. 2395.
120 See Galgano, supra note 112, at 297.
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about any irregularities discovered and also to send CONSOB the minutes
of the board meetings, the assessments made, and any other documents
deemed useful. Auditors, even as individuals, may ask the directors about
the state of the company's management or about other specific matters.
They can also call a meeting both of the shareholders and of the directors.
Finally, auditors can also report the facts to the court when they discover
serious irregularities in the management by the directors in violation of their
duties (article 151 of the T.U.I.F.).
Even though minority shareholders are indirectly protected by the
board of auditors, as described above, the Civil Code provides some tools
that give the minority shareholders the power to protect themselves directly.
A mild measure of self-defense for shareholders is provided by article 2408
of the Civil Code. It establishes that any shareholder can file a complaint
with the board of auditors concerning facts he deems censurable, and the
board of auditors shall take the complaint into account in its report to the
meeting. If the complaint is submitted by shareholders representing one-
fiftieth of the company's capital in listed companies, the board of auditors
shall investigate, without delay, the facts set forth in the complaint and
submit its findings and possible recommendations to the meeting. It must
also, in the circumstances referred to in article 2406,121 convene a meeting
of the members. The charter may contemplate, for purposes of the
complaint, lower percentages of participation.
A second self-defense mechanism for shareholders is much stronger
and more effective than the one described above. Article 2409 of the Civil
Code establishes that if there is a basis for suspicion of serious irregularities
in the management by the directors in violation of their duties, which may
damage the company or one or more of the controlled companies, the
shareholders representing one-twentieth of the company's capital (the by-
laws may provide for lower percentages of participation) can report the
facts to the tribunal.
The matters that can be reported to the court can be only those related
to the correct observance of the law and of the by-laws regulating the
directors' activity, and not to the advantage and opportunity of the
director's activity. 122 Shareholders who report to the court do not bear the
burden of proving the effective existence of the serious irregularities. They
only need prove the existence of elements constituting a basis for suspicion
of serious irregularities. 23 When the court deems that the elements
12' Article 2406, second paragraph, of the Civil Code establishes that the Board of
Auditors may, subject to communication to the chairman of the Board of Directors, convene
the meeting if, in the performance of its duties, it notices censurable serious facts and there is
the urgent need to take action.
122 Cass. Civ., 12. nov. 1965, n.2539, Giur. It. 1966, I, 1, c. 401.
123 See Galgano, supra note 112, at 316.
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produced do not constitute a well-founded basis for suspicion, or considers
that there are no elements justifying the serious irregularities required by
law, the claim is rejected. Otherwise, the court, after hearing the directors
and auditors in chambers, can order an investigation of the company's
management at the expense of the petitioning shareholders, conditioning
such investigation, if appropriate, on the posting of a bond (article 2409,
paragraph 2). The tribunal does not order the inspection and suspends the
proceedings for a period of time if the shareholders' meeting replaces the
directors and auditors with individuals of adequate professionalism, who,
without delay, do whatever necessary to verify if the breaches continue and,
if so, to eliminate them, reporting to the court on the controls and on the
activities performed (article 2409, third paragraph). If the reported
irregularities exist or if the controls and activities performed in accordance
with the third paragraph of article 2409 are inadequate for their removal, the
court can take the appropriate precautionary measures and call a meeting
for the purpose of making needed decisions. In the most serious cases, the
court can discharge the directors and auditors and appoint a judicial
administrator, specifying his powers and the time for which he will hold
office (article 2409, fourth paragraph). "In the most serious cases" means
situations in which collusion is clearly proved between a majority of the
shareholders and the directors, who acted with the conscious tolerance, if
not the incitement, of certain shareholders. As a logical consequence, it is
reasonable to deem that the appointment of a judicial administrator deprives
the shareholders' meeting of its authority. 
12 4
However, the two types of shareholders' meetings described in the
fourth paragraph of article 2409 still have significant freedom of action. In
fact, if the court simply takes precautionary measures, the shareholders'
meeting maintains all its powers: it can discharge and replace both the
directors and the auditors, decide about the distribution of the dividends,
approve the final budget, and bring up a suit against the directors. On the
other hand, "in the most serious cases" the meeting may still have the
powers that are compatible with the appointment of the judicial
administrator; 125 for instance, the meeting could determine the early
dissolution of the company and the appointment of the liquidators so as to
avoid the proceedings under article 2409.126 This option clearly shows that
the majority of the shareholders, even in such a situation, have total control
of the company, can avoid any kind of personal involvement in the
124 Id. at 318.
125 Cass. Civ., 19 july 1973, n.2113, Massimario del Foro It. 1973; Cass. Civ., 07 may
1963, n. 1113, Diritto Fallimentare 1964, 11, at 483; Cass. Civ., 14 nov. 1959, Foro It. 1960, 1,
c. 1178.
126 Trib. di Milano, 12 feb. 1973, Rivista di diritto processuale 1973 (commented by
Tedeschi), at 673, and Temi (commented by Ferri), at 187 (1973).
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proceedings against the directors and/or auditors, and can also save the
directors and/or auditors that were appointed, all to the detriment of the
minority shareholders' interest.
4. Shareholders' Right tolinformation and Inspection
Article 2422 of the Civil Code establishes that shareholders have the
right to inspect the books indicated in items 1 and 3 of article 2421
(respectively, the debentures book, the book of the sessions and resolutions
of the shareholders' meeting) and to obtain excerpts at their own expense. 
127
The shareholder can exercise her right both directly, by asking for
information and inspecting the books, and indirectly, under article 2408
(complaint to board of auditors).
5. External Auditing Firm
The auditing firm, whose role is for the most part established by the
T.U.I.F., has two different types of functions: a controlling function and a
reporting function. In exercising the first function, the auditing firm must
confirm that the accounts of the company are kept lawfully, that the
accounts books are correctly describing the economic situation of the
company, and that the rules in article 2426 of the Civil Code are complied
with (article 155, first paragraph of the T.U.I.F.). In addition, the auditing
firm has the power to obtain documents and information from the directors
of the company that could be useful for the auditing activity as well as to
carry out an inspection of the company's documents (article 155, second
paragraph of the T.U.I.F.).
The reporting function covers four different subjects: the shareholders,
the public, the board of auditors, and the CONSOB. Regarding the
shareholders, the auditing firm has to deposit reports and opinions about the
company at the company's head office so that the shareholders can examine
it before participating in the meetings. 28 Regarding the public, the auditing
firm has to deposit the same reports and opinions described above with the
minutes of the decisions taken at the shareholders' meeting at the
company's public registrar's office. Regarding the board of auditors, the
auditing firm must inform the board of facts deemed grave for the company,
so that the board, under article 2408, second paragraph of the Civil Code,
can immediately investigate these facts and then express its opinions and
suggestions regarding it at the shareholders' meeting. Finally, regarding the
127 C.C., supra note 87, at art. 2421.
128 For instance, article 156, fifth paragraph, of the T.U.I.F. states that the report about
the balance sheet and the balance sheet itself must remain deposited at the company's head
office during the 15 days preceding the shareholders' meeting and until the final balance has
been approved.
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CONSOB, the auditing firm must immediately give notice to the public
entity both when it expresses a negative opinion about the final balance or
declares itself to be unable to express an opinion about the balance (article
156, paragraph four of the T.U.I.F.).
The auditing firm does not have any direct liability to the shareholders,
only to the company, when it exercises its duty of auditing without the
ability and attention required by law. The firm can be held liable for failing
to discover fraud, subtraction of assets, and other malicious irregularities
committed by directors, auditors, and employees of the audited company,
only when this failure is caused by its negligence or its lack of auditing
capability. 29
6. The Right of Withdrawal
One of the most important ways to protect minority shareholders is to
grant them an easy exit from the company-the ability to dis-invest at a fair
price. One legal device which provides this type of protection is the creation
of a right of withdrawal. 130 When it is impossible to sell shares on the open
market at a reasonable price, minority shareholders only have the choice of
rescinding the contract with the corporation and getting the liquidated value
of their shares.
When the shareholders decide at a meeting to amend the company's
charter, minority shareholders who do not take part in that decision
(because they do not participate in the meeting, abstain from voting, or do
not agree with the decision) have the right of withdrawal for all or part of
their shares. Minority shareholders have this right granted when the
amendments to the charter are significant and important, i.e., in general,
when the level of risk that lead the shareholders to invest in the company
has substantially changed.131
Article 2347 of the Civil Code lists the events which give rise to the
right of withdrawal, including resolutions that modify shareholders'
administrative or economic rights, revoke the liquidation of the company,
and amend the criteria to evaluate shares applicable in case of withdrawal.
In addition to these events, article 131 of the T.U.I.F. establishes that
shareholders can exercise their right of withdrawal in the case of a corporate
merger if, as a consequence of the transaction, shareholders holding listed
"' See Trib. di Milano, 18 june 1992, Giur. It. 1993, I, 2, c. 1; see also Bonelli,
Responsabilitd della societd di revisione nella certificazione obbligatoria e volontaria dei
bilanci, Rivista Delle SocietA 1979, at 968.
130 See Ventoruzzo, supra note 84, at 35.
131 For instance, art. 2347, 1(a) of the Civil Code allows the right of withdrawal when a
significant change in the company's activity has been decided (for example, if a company
shifts from the production of automobiles to the production of shoes).
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shares would become owners of non-listed shares. 132 No additional bases
for withdrawal can be provided in the charter. The right of withdrawal is a
unilateral act of the shareholder and does not require any acceptance by the
company. The average share market price over the last six months is the
value that withdrawing shareholders will receive for their shares.
133
7. Groups of Companies and the Liability of the Controlling Stockholder
Large- and medium-sized enterprises typically structure their
organizations as a group of companies. When an enterprise reaches a
substantial size, because of its activity in various and different markets, it is
advantageous to organize the enterprise as a group of companies under the
control and management of a holding company.1 34 The larger the enterprise,
the more extensive the markets in which the company finds itself, and the
more numerous the shareholders.
Article 2497 of the Civil Code establishes that a holding company (or
its controlling shareholder) can be held liable to minority shareholders or
creditors of the company if the holding company caused damage through
mismanagement of the controlled companies. The rule, introduced by the
2003 Reform, cannot be considered a decisive remedy principally because
of the conditions that must be met to bring a suit and the burden of proof on
the minority shareholders (or creditors). First, the rule applies only in cases
of "direction and coordination"'135 of companies by a controlling
shareholder or holding company. The meaning of this term is ambiguous. In
fact, in a case of control through shared ownership there is a presumption
that the controlling shareholder or holding company accomplishes
"direction and coordination" of the controlled companies. But this
presumption can be easily overcome by proving that the shareholder
(presumably the controlling shareholder) has a "passive role" with regard to
the group. In addition, the rule does not apply when the controlling
shareholder is an individual; it applies only when the controlling
shareholder is a company or a legal entity. 36 The burden of proof on the
132 See NOTARI M., COMMENT TO ARTICLE 131, in LA DISCIPLINA DELLE SOCIETA
QUOTATE NEL TESTO UNICO DELLA FINANZA, at 1101 (P. Marchetti & L.A. Bianchi eds.,
1999).
133 See C.c., supra note 87, at art. 2347.
134 See Galgano, supra note 112, at 164 (stating that 50% of the Italian companies with
not less than 50 employees are part of a companies group, and that almost all Italian
companies with not less than 1000 employees are part of a group. Stating, also, that belong
to a companies group are 90% of the Japanese companies, 70% of the German companies,
65% of the U.S. companies, 60% of the French companies, 55% of the British companies,
and 50% of all Swiss companies).
135 C.c., supra note 87, at art. 2497.
136 Ventoruzzo notes that "as a consequence, many groups in which a large number of
corporations are controlled by one single individual, a situation that is often a prelude to
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shareholders of a controlled company presents a substantial obstacle to
success in a claim against the controlling shareholder or holding company.
To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff must prove that: (a) the controlling
shareholder or holding company was "acting in the entrepreneurial personal
interest or in the interest of other subjects,"137 (b) the "principles of good
management" were violated, and (c) the action caused "damage to the
profitability or value of the shares."' 8 None of these elements are clearly
defined by the Civil Code. It is difficult to precisely delineate the concepts
of "principles of good management" and "entrepreneurial interest."'1 39 In
addition, Article 2497 makes recovery difficult by putting a limit on the
controlling shareholder or holding company's liability when the damage
caused is counterbalanced by some advantage to the group, the so-called
"theory of compared benefits."1 40 Moreover, shareholders of a controlled
company may be discouraged from bringing a suit against a controlling
shareholder or holding company because the Italian legal system does not
allow for contingency fees and is characterized by the "loser pays" rule.
This rule, together with the "information asymmetry" between the parties
inherent in this type of lawsuit, clearly puts a shareholder of the controlled
company in a weak position and therefore is a convincing disincentive to go
misappropriation of assets of controlled corporations" are not subject to article 2497 and
highlighting that Article 2497, second paragraph,
provides for joint and several liability against whoever takes part in causing the damage or
whoever knowingly took advantage of it, for up to the amount of the benefit received.
Through this rule, individuals who intentionally participate in or take advantage of control
might be held liable, but the subject who exercises direction and coordination must in any
case be a legal entity.
See Ventoruzzo, supra note 84, at 46.
137 C.c., supra note 87, at art. 2497.
138 Id.
139 See Ventoruzzo, supra note 84, at 46.
140 See Montalenti, Conflitto d'Interesse nei Gruppi di Societgt e Teoria dei Vantaggi
Compensativi, Giurisprudenza Commentata, at 710 (1995). See also Ventoruzzo, supra note
84, at 47 (giving the following example: "[I]f the holding company requires the controlled
corporation to purchase goods at an inflated price, but also assists the controlled corporation
in selling its own products at a higher price, the damage would be deemed to be offset and
no liability would result." Also,
[w]hile this limitation of liability seems logical in such a simplistic example, it is easy to
imagine how any degree of complexity can make application of rule uncertain, and the
burden of the proof unbearable for minority investors who, by definition, suffer from an
information asymmetry (in particular in a system that does not have procedural discovery
mechanisms). These circumstance [sic] provide obvious advantages for the controlling
shareholder.
Id. at 47.
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before a court and bear the risks of a trial.
D. The Role of the CONSOB-The Italian SEC
CONSOB 141 is a governmental authority given the power to control the
activities of all entities operating in financial markets (banks, investment
firms, brokers, dealers, and agents). Its role includes ensuring observance
of the law by the companies managing financial markets and monitoring the
conduct of the companies issuing financial products. The rules governing
CONSOB's powers are mainly described in the T.U.I.F. The main purpose
of CONSOB is to protect investors as well as to maintain transparency and
efficiency of financial markets.
The supervisory controls over the issuing companies start before they
are listed on the market. In fact, CONSOB controls the content of the listing
prospectus and can authorize its publication.142 After the issuing companies
have been listed, all communications from the companies to the public that
contain important facts are supervised by CONSOB, which has the power
to ask the issuing companies to disclose specific information and
documents deemed necessary in order to properly inform the public. If the
issuing company does not comply with this request, CONSOB can replace
the company in disseminating this information. In fact, article 115 of the
T.U.I.F. empowers CONSOB to verify whether the information given to the
public by the issuing companies is true. 144 To accomplish this, CONSOB
can solicit information and documents from the issuing company and its
controllers. 45 Moreover, CONSOB can inspect the issuing company's
premises, as well the controlling company's premises.1 46 Even auditing
firms are under the supervision of CONSOB in order to guarantee their
independence and technical skills. 147 CONSOB can ask the auditing firm to
communicate information, data, and documents,148 and can inspect the
auditing firm's premises and directly request information from firm
shareholders and directors.149 In the case of a violation of the disclosure
obligations, as well as communication to the public and CONSOB (articles
113, 114, and 115 of the T.U.I.F.), article 193 of the T.U.I.F. allows a
monetary administrative sanction (from a minimum amount of E5,000 to a
141 CONSOB is an acronym for Commissione Nazionale per le SocietA e la Borsa, i.e.
National Committee for the Companies and the Financial Market.
142 T.U.I.F, supra note 41, at art. 113, 2(a).
"' Id. at art. 114.
'44Id. at art. 115, 1.
145 Id. at art. 115, l(a)-(b).
1
4 6 Id. at art. 115, 1(c).
141 Id. at art. 162.
148 T.U.I.F, supra note 41, at art. 162, 2(a).
141 Id. at art. 162, T 2(b).
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maximum amount of E100,000) for whoever exercises management,
control, or directive activities. 150 Solicitation activity without CONSOB
authorization or the required communication (e.g., the listing prospectus) is
also punishable by monetary administrative sanction (from a minimum of
E5,000 to a maximum of E 100,000).
151
IV. PROTECTION OF LISTED COMPANY MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS IN THE U.S. SYSTEM
A. The Instruments Offered by U.S. Corporate Law to Protect Minority
Shareholders
Minority shareholders have an important role in the governance of a
corporation. The influence of a minority shareholder may vary according to
the type and size of the corporation. For instance, one distinguishing factor
is whether the corporation is closely or publicly held. Although issues of
corporate governance generally arise more frequently in publicly traded
companies, minority shareholders' rights and actions are pertinent primarily
in the context of closely held corporations. 52 Thus, a public company may
struggle with the fiduciary duties associated with the rights of minority
shareholders, while a closely held corporation may find itself dealing more
with issues of corporate governance. Publicly traded companies tend to
eliminate preemptive rights or cumulative voting provisions when the
implementation of these legal mechanisms depends upon the discretion of
the corporation. 53 Eliminating preemptive rights significantly impairs the
rights of minority shareholders because it leaves them without economic
protection and active participation in the business. However, other legal
instruments for minority shareholders remain, such as shareholders'
agreements. Furthermore, the possibility of minority shareholder suits may
pose a threat to corporations, especially those that are publicly held. Thus,
the rights of the minority and the duties owed to them by directors may
differ between a public company and a closely held one. Minority
shareholders, however, are present in both entities and equally important in
150 Id. at art. 193, 1.
"' Id. at art. 191, 1-2.
152 See 2 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, ch. 10, § 10:03, at 10 (Callaghan & Co. Supp. 2004) (suggesting
that the precarious position of minority shareholders in a close corporation mitigates against
reliance upon traditional statutes).
153 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions As Relational Investors: A New Look at
Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 124, 160 (1994) (reciting a 1989 survey that
indicated only eighteen percent of 1500 companies used cumulative voting).
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the control of the company. Status as a minority shareholder confers certain
legal rights that protect their role in the battle over company control.
1. Minority Shareholders and Oppression.
A minority shareholder is a shareholder who does not have the ability
to elect a majority of the board of directors or has little power in the
corporation. This definition, however, seems flawed because minority
shareholders can exercise some control and even defeat the majority in
certain circumstances. 154 Thus, a complete analysis of minority shareholder
status must include the examination of both the ability to control voting
stock and the percentage of ownership. Because the minority shareholder
has some control, the minority may disagree with the majority over certain
business decisions. When a conflict arises, the majority may not wish to
have any further confrontation with the minority by diluting, if not
eliminating, the tangible and intangible value of the minority interest. The
majority most commonly achieves the dilution of the minority interest
through oppression.
a. Squeeze-Outs and Freeze-Outs
The weak position of minority shareholders in some corporations
subjects them to the oppression of controlling shareholders and directors.
The minority shareholders may become an obstacle for the majority in
controlling the company if, for example, the minority vote is required to
approve a corporate transaction or if the minority has the right to request
periodic dividends. This nuisance, if not a real impediment, can lead
majority shareholders and directors to utilize oppressive measures, such as
withholding dividends or diluting shares. 155 Such actions, known as freeze-
outs and squeeze-outs respectively, 156 allow controlling groups to exploit
and remove minority shareholders. Minority shareholders hold special
rights, however, that guard against these tactics. These rights originate from
the fiduciary duties imposed on the majority shareholders, the corporation's
management, and the board of directors for the benefit of the minority
shareholder.
There are three forms of freeze-out actions: management buyouts,
short form mergers, and reverse stock splits.
154 See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 516-18 (Mass. 1975)
(finding that minority shareholders may sue majority shareholders when they do not act with
the "utmost good faith and loyalty").
155 See O'NEAL, supra note 152, at vol. 1, ch. 3, § 3:02, at 3 (listing a refusal to declare
dividends as a common tactic to exclude minority shareholders); id. at vol. 1, ch. 3, § 3:20, at
191-92 (stating that the issuance of new stock and control over the disposition of that stock
is another way to diminish a minority shareholder's power).
156 See id. at vol. 1, ch. 3, § 3:02, at 3 (describing various oppressive techniques).
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b. Management Buyout
A management buyout is the purchase of a target company by a newly-
formed company comprising the target's old management and new partners
as equity holders. 157 The old management and new partners use the new
company to buy the old company, which is the target of the merger.
Management has an incentive to make the merger succeed to the detriment
of the old company. 5 8 This merger raises questions of self-dealing and
fairness because majority shareholders buy their old company along with
the minority's interest.
c. Short-Form Mergers
Short-form mergers allow a parent-subsidiary merger with a cash
payout to minority shareholders of the subsidiary.159 The potential problem
presented by such a transaction is that when the subsidiary is merged, no
shareholder vote is required. 60 In the parent corporation, shareholders do
not have dissenter's rights, such as appraisal and cash out options.16' To
avoid this result, several states now follow the Model Business
Corporations Act ("MBCA") which allows a short-form merger only when
the parent owns at least ninety percent of the subsidiary's shares. Minority
shareholders can be cashed out or seek appraisal.
62
d. Reverse Stock Splits
A reverse stock split merges shares into smaller units. After the split,
shareholders owning less than a full share may be cashed out.' 63 The
corporation can create fractions small enough to insure the cashing out of
all minority shareholders. 164 To avoid fractional problems, cash payouts are
allowed by statute. 65 Insiders can use these laws to effectuate a freeze-out.
157 See COX ET AL., supra note 157, § 23.01, at 636 (2003) (defining the customary form
of a management buyout).
58 See id. § 23.02, at 639 (indicating that the target company's management holds the
responsibility for its merger into the new company).
159 See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 12.1, at 502 (1986) (indicating the
nature of a short-form merger).
160 See Cox, supra note 157, § 22.12, at 611 (exposing a potential danger of the short-
form merger).
161 Id. (placing shareholders of the parent in a disadvantageous position due to a
diminution of their shareholder's rights).
162 Id. at 612.
163 See O'NEAL, supra note 152, § 5:11, at 73 (stating the effect that a reverse stock split
may have).
164 Id. (explaining the potential extreme consequences of a reverse stock split).
165 Id. (promoting corporate convenience by enabling the corporation to squeeze out
minority shareholders).
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Many states have enacted statutes to prevent reverse stock splits without a
minimum percentage of shareholder approval.
66
2. Nature of the Fiduciary Duties Owed to the Minority Shareholders in
Public and Private Companies. Duty of Care, Duty of Loyalty, and Duty of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The fiduciary duties owed by controlling shareholders and directors to
minority shareholders are one of the forms of granting protection to
minority shareholders in a corporation. These duties impose an obligation
upon majority shareholders and directors to act in good faith concerning the
corporate affairs of the company. This obligation includes the promotion of
corporate and shareholder interests above personal individual interests.
167
The traditional principle of fiduciary duties owed to minority shareholders
derives from the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Southern Pacific
Co. v. Bogert.'68 The border separating duties owed to the corporation and
those owed to shareholders by directors and officers is relatively difficult to
discern. Traditional wisdom dictates that management serves the interests
of the corporation by maximizing shareholder wealth. 69 Thus, directors
should try to maximize shareholder value, which seems to imply a duty
both to the corporation and to the shareholders.
a. Duty of Care
One facet of fiduciary duty is the duty of care that corporate actors
may owe one another. Directors owe a duty of care to the corporation when
exercising their managerial powers.170 The duty of care is a standard of
conduct that directors must follow. A non-statutory principle, known as the
business judgment rule,' 7' establishes the standard for imposing liability on
166 See CLARK, supra note 159, § 12.1, at 503 (noting that insiders can use the "'cash in
lieu of fractional shares' provisions to effect freeze-outs").
167 See Cox, supra note 157, § 11.11, at 253 (suggesting that controlling shareholders
owe the same duties as the directors and that self-dealing may be permissible if it also serves
corporate objectives).
168 Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919) ("The majority has the
right to control; but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary duty toward the minority; as
much so as the corporation itself or its officers or directors.")
169 See Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders (or How Investor
Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty), 53 Bus. LAW. 429, 430 (1998) (recognizing the
ultimate purpose of a corporation).
170 See Cox, supra note 157, § 10.2, at 186 (describing broadly a director's duty of care).
171 Id. § 10.3, at 190 (noting that the business judgment rule was formulated by courts
long before the creation of statutory duties). The business judgment rule is based upon the
understanding that directors may make corporate decisions without being held liable when
they are pursuing a legitimate business purpose that is within the scope of their authority. Id.
§ 10.01, at 185 (stating that the applicability of the business judgment rule has limits).
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directors for failing to exercise due care.172 The business judgment rule
primarily addresses the care with which directors make decisions. 173 The
business judgment rule's interaction with the duty of care is illustrated in
Smith v. Van Gorkom. 7 4 In essence, the business judgment rule establishes
a presumption that the officers and directors have met the duty of care.
Minority shareholders may challenge the duty of care taken on behalf of the
corporation or through a receiver appointed following the financial collapse
of the corporation. With respect to the dynamics of corporate governance,
the duty of care represents an instrument of protection and, at the same
time, of control. 75 Shareholders possess dual interests: their economic
investment and their level of active participation in the business.
76
Fiduciary duties, including the duty of care, significantly assist minority
shareholders in protecting their interests and exerting corporate control.
Protection of these minority interests and enforcement of fiduciary duties
reflects a necessary check on the exercise of power by the controlling
director. Should a director violate his duties, a minority shareholder may
bring a derivative suit to hold the director liable for actions in violation of
the duty of care.177 Courts, however, are reluctant to ascertain whether
directors acted in the best interests of a corporation,1 8 acknowledging that
Therefore, the rule is the counterweight to the duty of care. The line between these two
principles is not well settled. See id. § 10.01, at 190 (deciding that courts must allow some
business discretion in determining director negligence).
172 Id. § 10.01, at 184 (stating that "directors are not liable for losses due to imprudence
or honest errors").
173 See id. § 10.01, at 185 (suggesting courts will not second guess business decisions and
will presume reasonable care and diligence in making those decisions).
174 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (The directors approved a merger
agreement, but they did not fully inform the shareholders, or themselves, of all material
facts. The court determined that the proper standard of review under the business judgment
rule was gross negligence. The opinion concluded that the actions of the board of directors
were grossly negligent. Therefore, the board breached its fiduciary duty, warranting a
determination of the damages to be assessed personally against the directors).
175 See Cox, supra note 157, § 10.2, at 187 (noting that the imposition of the duty of care
encourages responsible management and ensures few transgressions).
176 Id § 13.1, at 328 (including rights to share in profits and rights of management control
among the classes of rights owed to shareholders).
177 Id § 15.1, at 419 (calling shareholder derivative suits the main remedy minority
shareholders can use to hold directors responsible for corporate mismanagement).
178 See Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976)
(advocating the business judgment rule by saying that "the directors' room rather than the
courtroom is the appropriate forum for thrashing out purely business questions... [and]
substitution of someone else's business judgment for that of the directors is no business for
any court to follow.") But see Brane v. Roth, 590 N.E.2d 587, 592 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that the business judgment rule does not shield the directors from liability when
there is a breach of fiduciary duties. A finding of gross negligence by the directors is not
necessary to hold them liable).
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the "business and affairs of a corporation are managed by a board of
directors not by a panel of judges.' 179 In spite of this general reluctance by
the courts, the threat alone of legal liability suffices as a remedy by
persuading, if not compelling, directors to comply with the duties imposed
upon them.
b. Duty of Loyalty
Under the duty of loyalty, directors can be accused of a conflict of
interest for receiving a personal benefit from a business decision. 180 The
duty of loyalty attempts to prevent any corruption and personal profit that
may arise from self-dealing to the detriment of shareholders. 181 Self-dealing
involves a transaction where a director may benefit personally from
corporate action. 182 If the transaction is fair to the corporation, 183 no
violation of the duty of care arises. The basic principle of fairness explains
the intersection between the duty of loyalty, the duty of care, and the
concepts of good faith and fair dealing.' 84 Courts will likely look at the
fairness, purpose, and intent of director and shareholder actions to
determine whether they have violated a fiduciary duty owed to the minority
shareholders. 185 Fiduciary duties implicate not only the director's duties
owed to the corporation's shareholders, but also a duty of good faith and
fair dealing.
c. Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The landmark case of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.' 86 indicated fair
179 Jay P. Moran, Business Judgment Rule or Relic?: CEDE v. Technicolor and the
Continuing Metamorphosis of Director Duty of Care, 45 EMORY L.J. 339 (1996) (noting
that the business judgment rule recognizes the voluntary risk that a bad management
decision may be undertaken and that judges are not directors).
180 See Cox, supra note 157, § 10.09, at 204 (suggesting that the duty of loyalty is the
motive behind a director's corporate action).
181 See Arthur R. Pinto, Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors in
American Corporations, 46 AM. J. COMp. L. 317, 332 (1998) (stating that under a duty of
loyalty directors can be held liable for a conflict of interest for receiving any personal benefit
from a business director).
182 See CLARK, supra note 159, § 4.1, at 142-43 (providing an example of how a director
may become involved in self-dealing).
183 Id. § 4.1, at 168-69 (allowing a self-dealing transaction to stand if it is fair to the
corporation).
184 Id. (acknowledging that good faith and fair dealing are components of the duty of
loyalty).
185 See O'NEAL, supra note 152, § 7:03, at 11-12 (2003) (examining the components of
corporate fiduciary duty).
186 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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dealing as a basic component of fairness. 187 Good faith and fair dealing
appear to be imprecise concepts and, as such, require fact-intensive analyses
that have resulted in less than uniform case law. Several opinions, however,
have addressed the fiduciary duties that directors owe to a corporation and
its shareholders, as well as the right to fairness and general standards of
treatment and fair dealing within a corporation. Burt v. Burt Boiler Works,
Inc.,188 and Coleman v. Taub,189 demonstrate that directors and controlling
shareholders must consider minority interests and participation with respect
to fair dealing and good faith, as well as other fiduciary duties.
B. Minority Shareholders Rights Under United States Law
Examining the role of the minority shareholders in the governance of a
company reveals the protection afforded to them. These protections include
investment rights, profit rights, corporate affairs rights, shareholder
agreements, and derivative actions, all of which were created either as a
means of protection or as a corporate weapon. In fact, these rights enable
shareholders to advance their interest in a corporation and can sometimes
become powerful weapons in the hand of minority shareholders.
1. Preemptive Rights
A preemptive right is the right of a shareholder to participate in capital
increases of a corporation to the extent of his ownership of shares. 190
Essentially, this right provides a shareholder with the option to purchase a
share of new stock issued by the corporation and maintain his proportionate
ownership interest in the firm.191 Thus, when a corporation offers new stock
for the purpose of increasing its capital, the shareholders are entitled to opt
for the acquisition of shares pursuant to their corresponding holdings before
any third party interested in the venture may purchase new stock.'
9F
2. Share of Profits
The right to a share of the company's profits is another important right
afforded to shareholders. A business corporation is organized and carried on
187 Id. at 711 (explaining fair dealing in the context of a merger and buyout of minority
shares).
188 Burt v. Burt Boiler Works, Inc., 360 So. 2d 327 (Ala. 1978).
189 Coleman v. Taub, 638 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1981).
190 See COX, supra note 157, § 16.14, at 496-497 (stating that preemptive rights allow a
shareholder to participate ratably in new issues of shares).
191 See CLARK, supra note 159, § 17.1.4, at 719 (explaining preemptive rights as an
option for shareholders to maintain their interest by buying an equal percentage of new
shares offered).
192 See Cox, supra note 157, § 16.14, at 497 (noting that preemptive rights of existing
shareholders are optional or void in most states).
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primarily for the profit of the owners, i.e., the shareholders. Directors
should utilize their powers to that end. Regardless of whether directors owe
only fiduciary duties to shareholders or whether the directors' only
objective should be to maximize shareholders' wealth, shareholders possess
the right to receive the profits of their investment.1 93 Therefore, directors are
obligated to make distributions to shareholders whenever it is in the best
interests of the corporation.
3. Corporate Governance Rights
Share ownership empowers a shareholder to participate in the business
and the affairs of a company. The most remarkable rights of a shareholder
in connection with his ownership are voting rights.1 14 As a general rule,
each outstanding share owned by a shareholder entitles him to one vote on
each matter proposed at the shareholders' meeting. 95 Matters subject to the
vote and approval of the shareholders include the election of directors,
corporate transactions, and amendments to the articles of incorporation.
A shareholder's main source of corporate control is his right to elect
representatives to the board of directors.1 96 A minority shareholder or a
group of minority shareholders who elect one or more members of the
board of directors holds an advantageous position in the control of the
company. Because corporations are run by directors, having representation
on the board ensures that the directors and controlling shareholders will pay
attention to the minority's interests.
Section 7.28(a) of the MBCA provides that the directors win an
election by a plurality of the votes, which may only be cast by the holders
of shares entitled to vote in the election, at a meeting where a quorum
exists, unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation.197 The
approach of the MBCA in this section is known as straight voting,' 98 a
system of voting that entitles a shareholder to cast one vote per share for
193 Id. at 328 (defining a "share of stock" as a profit-sharing contract that allows the right
to participate in dividend distributions).
194 Id. § 13.1, at 328 (stating that the first class of shareholder rights, which centers on
control and management, includes voting rights).
195 See Model Bus. Corp. Act § 7.21(a) (1984) (amended 1987) (providing that (i) except
as provided by such Act or "unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise, each
outstanding share, regardless of class, is entitled to one vote on each proposition voted on at
a shareholders' meeting"; and (ii) only shares are entitled to vote).
196 See Cox, supra note 157, § 13.1, at 328 (listing the fight to elect directors as a first-
class right in a shareholder's control and management).
197 See Model Bus. Corp. Act, supra note 195, § 7.28(a) (1984) (amended 1987)
(providing the applicable provisions for voting on corporate directors).
198 Id. § 7.28(b) (denying the right to cumulative voting, unless it is provided in a
corporation's articles of incorporation).
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each position on the board of directors. 199 Under such a system, holders of a
bare majority of voting shares have the ability to elect the corporation's
entire board of directors. 00 As a consequence, minority shareholders cannot
obtain the amount of votes necessary to elect a director. Two methods,
however, attempt to insure representation of the minority on the board:
cumulative voting and voting agreements. 20 ' Both methods demonstrate the
effectiveness of statutory devices in safeguarding a role for the minority in
corporate governance.
MBCA section 7.28(c) provides for the possibility of cumulative
voting for directors. This means that the designated shareholders may
multiply the number of votes that they are entitled to by the number of
directors for whom they are entitled to vote and cast the product for a single
candidate or distribute the product among two or more candidates. 202 The
election of corporate directors through cumulative voting is designed to
grant representation on the board of directors to minority shareholders
owning a substantial number of shares.20 3 It enables minority shareholders
to monitor and report the actions of directors elected by majority
*20interests. ° Cumulative voting provisions are corporate governance
provisions because they give control to the minority, thereby affecting the
205
governance of the company. The extent of this control depends on several
factors: (i) the number of directors on the board; (ii) the use of other
mechanisms to advance the interests of the minority, such as shareholders'
agreements or preemptive rights; and (iii) the attendance and voting
quorums set forth in the bylaws of the corporation. Although cumulative
voting is not mandatory under many state statutes, in those jurisdictions
where cumulative voting is required or for those corporations that choose to
opt-in, cumulative voting can be considered an effective device for minority
199 See Cox, supra note 157, § 13.16, at 348 (defining straight voting as "casting votes
according to the number of shares held for each vacancy").
200 See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING
PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 435 (6th ed. 1998) (providing an example
of how straight voting may allow a majority shareholder to elect the entire board of
directors).
201 See Cox, supra note 157, § 13.16, at 349 (explaining that the policy goal of
cumulative voting is to provide the minority a greater chance of obtaining representation on
the board).
202 See Model Bus. Corp. Act, supra note 194, § 7.28(c) (1984) (amended 1987)
(describing cumulative voting).
203 See Cox, supra note 157, § 13.16, at 349-50 (observing that the usefulness of
cumulative voting resides in the concentration of shares in the hands of a few that represent a
large portion of the outstanding shares).
204 Id. § 13.16, at 350 (emphasizing that the "aim of cumulative voting is to allow a
minority to secure representation on the board of directors.")
205 Id. § 13.16, at 349 (describing the aim of cumulative voting and how, without it,
minority shareholders would have no representation and no power over corporate affairs).
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shareholders to participate in corporate governance.
Shareholders may also join forces to elect directors and gain power in
the control and management of the company. Voting agreements gained
legitimacy in Brightman v. Bates.20 6 A group of shareholders agreed to vote
their shares in a certain way.2 °7 Several minority shareholders objected, but
the court allowed the agreement, stating that "[i]t is as legitimate for a
majority of stockholders to combine as for other people. 20 8 FolloWing that
judicial rule, MBCA section 7.31 established an additional mechanism to
ensure minority representation on the board of directors-the voting
agreement.20 9 MBCA section 7.31 also allows two or more shareholders to
provide for the manner in which they will vote their shares by signing an
agreement to that effect, which will be recognized as specifically
enforceable . 0
Shareholders' meetings involve more than decisions concerning the
election of the board of directors.2 1 1 The real computation of power relies
upon the value of the shareholder's vote. Value must be determined in light
of meeting attendance measured against the quorum requirements set forth
in both statutes and the bylaws of a corporation. The higher the quorum
requirement, the greater the chances for the minority to influence the
outcome of the shareholder meetings and affect the adoption of certain
resolutions.21 2 However, in the case of a disagreement, where the majority
generally has the power to decide what it considers suitable, quorum
requirements may demand the casting of minority shareholder votes.213
Therefore, statutory provisions that intend to promote or impede minority
governance establish voting quorums correlative to the nature of the matters
before a meeting.21 4 Matters concerning fundamental changes to the
structure of a corporation, such as mergers or sales of assets, are subject to a
greater quorum so that a minority vote is required to effect such major
206 Brightman v. Bates, 55 N.E. 809 (Mass. 1900).
207 Id. (reviewing the formation of the agreement).
208 Id. (concluding that any corporate shareholder may enter into a voting agreement).
209 See Model Bus. Corp. Act, supra note 194, § 7.31 (1984) (amended 1987) (asserting a
shareholder's right to enter into voting agreements).
210 Id. (explaining that an agreement under section 7.31 is not subject to the voting trust
provisions of section 7.30). Id. §7.32(b)(1) (emphasizing that all shareholders must have
knowledge of the agreement).
211 See CLARK, supra note 159, § 9.1.4, at 366 (addressing shareholders' votes).
212 See O'NEAL, supra note 152, § 9:08, at 19 (stating that high voting requirements may
be one of the most effective ways of protecting minority shareholders from squeeze-outs).
213 See Cox, supra note 157, § 13.13, at 344 (exploring how various state laws can allow
for varying percentages of a quorum and a vote, any of which could benefit or harm the
minority shareholder).
214 Id. (stating that the vote required is only of those shares present, not the total of
outstanding shares).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 26:373 (2006)
changes.215
4. Appraisal Rights
The risk of oppression of minority shareholders' rights because of
mergers' 6 and certain other fundamental corporate changes are tempered
by statutes, often referred to as "appraisal statutes" or "dissenters' rights
statutes."' These statutes empower a shareholder who dissents from such a
transaction to demand that the corporation purchase her shares at a fair
price.217 "Dissenters' rights statutes are designed to protect non-assenting
shareholders against being forced to accept membership in an enterprise
fundamentally different from the one in which they originally invested or to
participate on a basis drastically different from the one they contemplated
when they invested."2 8 The right to dissent or appraisal allows a minority
shareholder to disagree with the decision made by the majority, abstain
from continuing any further corporate activity, and obtain the fair value of
his shares. 219 Thus, appraisal rights give minority shareholders a "way out"
when disagreeing with the corporate management.
In general, the MBCA offers dissenter appraisal rights for any situation
215 Id. (noting that in some states this quorum can be two-thirds).
216 See CLARK, supra note 159, § 12.1, at 501 (asserting that mergers can be referred to as
cash-out mergers, which implies that there is a cash payment to some of the shareholders of
a corporation in exchange for their shares, instead of an issuance of new shares as a result of
the merger). It is also relevant to address the concept of freeze-out mergers, in which a
minority shareholder is forced to accept cash or debt securities for his or her shares rather
than stock in the surviving corporation. See Id. § 12.1, at 499-500 (denoting that the
inevitable effect of a freeze-out is that common shareholders are regarded as holders of
redeemable preferred stock).
217 See O'NEAL, supra note 152, § 5:29, at 5-201 (noting that appraisal statutes attempt to
provide relief to the dissenting shareholder).
218 Id. (explaining that appraisal statutes are a legislative creation designed to blunt the
harsh effects of common law rules requiring unanimous shareholder consent for fundamental
changes to the corporation).
219 See Barry M. Wertheimer, The Purpose of the Shareholders' Appraisal Remedy, 65
TENN. L. Rcv. 661, 666 (1998) (characterizing as "standard corporate law dogma" the notion
that the appraisal remedy was granted to shareholders in exchange for the loss of the right to
veto fundamental changes to the corporate structure). This right is a shareholders' appraisal
remedy and it has been noted to have the following purposes: (i) to serve as a "quid pro quo"
for the loss of the right to veto fundamental transactions; (ii) to provide liquidity to keep
shareholders from being locked into an investment in a corporation that has been
fundamentally changed; (iii) to remedy a potential constitutional problem with statutes that
permit a majority of shareholders to decide whether to engage in a fundamental transaction;
(iv) to free the majority from the "tyranny of the minority;" (v) to relieve shareholders from
concerns arising out of coordination problems or problems associated with the appropriation
of corporate value by insiders; (vi) to serve as a check on corporate managers; and (vii) to
ensure that shareholders whose investments are terminated by a cash out merger receive fair
value for their shares.
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in which the majority shareholders effect a fundamental change in the
corporation, such as an amendment to the articles of incorporation or a
major corporate transaction.220 Section 13.02 of the MBCA provides that a
shareholder is afforded the opportunity to dissent to a merger proposal and
receive the fair value of the shares if the merger is consummated.22'
Dissenting shareholders may seek appraisal rights in the following
corporate transactions: a consummation of a share-exchange plan where the
corporation is the target; a sale or exchange of all, or substantially all, of the
assets of the corporation other than in the ordinary course of business; 222 a
material amendment to the articles of incorporation that negatively affects a
dissenting shareholder's rights;223 or any action taken by the corporation in
response to a shareholder vote for which shareholders have the right to
dissent and obtain payment for their shares.224 Sections 13.20 through 13.28
of the MBCA direct shareholders to exercise appraisal rights before
resorting to the courts. The procedure to do so is explained in the official
comment following each section. The MBCA contemplates a judicial
appraisal of shares in sections 13.30 and 13.31. A judicial appraisal results
upon a failure to reach a settlement as to the payment of the value of the
shares between the controlling and dissenting shareholders.22 5
a. Lack of Adequate Protection for Minority Shareholders Through
Appraisal Rights
Dissenters' rights present two major gaps in the protection offered to
shareholders. First, dissenters' rights are triggered by only a limited number
of transactions that affect fundamental changes in a minority shareholder's
rights.226 Second, these disputed transactions represent only a few of the
possible transactions that can drastically restructure a company or
220 See Model Bus. Corp. Act, supra note 194, § 13.02(a)(1)-(5) (1984) (amended 1987)
(listing the triggering events that allow appraisal and payment).
221 Id. § 13.02(a)(1). In cases where shareholder approval is required for the merger
pursuant to MBCA section 11.03 or if the corporation is a subsidiary that has merged with its
parent under MBCA section 11.04 or the articles of incorporation, a shareholder is entitled to
vote on the merger.
222 Id. § 13.02(a)(3) (providing that sales as a result of a court order or for cash, as part of
a plan whereby the net proceeds are distributed to shareholders up to one year following the
date of sale, are not included under this provision).
2213 Id. § 13.02(a)(4) (explaining that amendments affect dissenters' shares by altering,
abolishing, or creating rights, and excluding or limiting voting capabilities).
224 Id. § 13.02 (addressing the situations where a shareholder may disagree and refund its
shares for cash).
225 See O'NEAL, supra note 152, § 5:29, at 5-201 (explaining that statutes allow appraisal
when the corporation and shareholder cannot agree on a reasonable price).
226 See Cox, supra note 157, § 22.18, at 617-19 (establishing which actions allow
dissenting shareholders the appraisal remedy).
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fundamentally change a shareholder's rights.227 The majority can often
utilize a type of transaction that does not trigger dissenters' rights to
achieve a corporate restructuring that if attempted differently would give a
dissenting minority shareholder the opportunity to have his shares
purchased. The laws governing these transactions appear to have the effect
of offering more protection to the majority than to the minority.228 In fact,
corporation statutes make as few concessions as possible to dissenting
shareholders229 and only provide appraisal rights for fundamental
changes.230 For instance, under Delaware law appraisal rights exist for
mergers or consolidations but not for the sale of assets or amendments to
the corporate charter.231 Therefore, controlling shareholders can easily
structure a transaction to avoid triggering appraisal rights.232 Just as in the
case of buy-sell agreements,233 dissenters' rights give a "way out" to the
minority when its interests conflict with those of the majority or the
business no longer fulfills its expectations.234
5. Derivative Actions
A derivative action is a lawsuit filed against a wrongdoer whose
actions have caused harm to the corporation. The plaintiff shareholder has
suffered no specific harm due to the wrongdoer's actions, but has seen his
or her investment decline in value because of the harm to the corporation.
The corporation is the real party in interest in a derivative case. This right,
the so-called derivative suit, is triggered when management takes an action
that may injure the company and, indirectly, the shareholders. Shareholder
derivative suits are the main remedy by which "defrauded minority
shareholders may call directors, officers, promoters, and controlling
shareholders to account for mismanagement, diversion of assets, and
227 Id. § 22.19, at 619 (stating that appraisal rights exist for fundamental changes, sales of
certain assets, and amendments affecting shareholder rights).
228 Id. at 621 (contrasting the theory and reality of the statutory appraisal remedy).
229 Id. (suggesting that the intent of appraisal statutes is to avoid interference and
obstruction from minority shareholders acting in bad faith).
230 Id. at 619 (indicating that states generally allow appraisal rights for "certain
fundamental changes").
231 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262 (1991 & Supp. 1998) (delineating the appropriate
uses of appraisal rights in Delaware).
232 See Cox, supra note 157, § 22.20, at 624 (showing how the majority may avoid
appraisal rights altogether by leaving substantial assets in the corporation).
233 See Stephenson v. Drever, 947 P.2d 1301, 1302 (Cal. 1997) (stating that a typical buy-
sell agreement provides for the mandatory or optional repurchase of a shareholder's shares
by the corporation or by the other shareholders upon the occurrence of a certain event, such
as the termination of employment).
234 See CLARK, supra note 159, § 10.6, at 444 (allowing appraisal as a remedy against
being forced unwillingly into a venture).
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fraudulent manipulation of corporate affairs., 235 The possibility of bringing
an action against directors or shareholders and obtaining damages is an
attractive remedy for minority shareholders. Derivative suits are a
remarkable instrument of power for the minority.236 Moreover, the threat of
derivative actions makes derivative suits useful tools for obtaining
corporate power. Examples of potential actions include violations of
minority shareholders' rights, oppressive actions against the minority, or
breach of fiduciary duties owed to the minority. Before executing any
action, directors and shareholders must carefully consider the risks
associated with a trial's outcome, which can range from the award of
damages to the dissolution of the company.
There are some tight procedural requirements that, in most states, a
shareholder must meet in order to maintain a derivative suit. First of all, to
commence a derivative action, a shareholder must have been a shareholder
at the time complaints are made. Second, whoever brings a derivative suit
must continue to hold shares throughout the derivative proceeding, in fact a
shareholder who transfers stock either before or during a derivative
proceeding loses standing to further prosecute the case.238 Finally, before
commencing a derivative action, the complaining shareholder must make a
demand on the board of directors to seek redress for the alleged wrong done
to the corporation. The demand requirement will be excused if the demand
for action would be futile (e.g., in cases in which the sole or controlling
directors are the alleged wrongdoers).
239
a. The Nature of Derivative Suits
Derivative actions do not advance the interests of the minority in a
tangible manner.2 40 They do, however, protect minority interests and
constitute an instrument of control. The potential for derivative actions
brought by minority shareholders serves more as a motivation, rather than a
method, for protecting minority interests. In theory, directors should avoid
oppressive courses of action, taking into account the business and corporate
position of the minority. In Wessin v. Archives Corporation,2 41 the
235 Cox, supra note 157, § 15.01, at 419.
236 Id. § 15.02, at 419-20 (noting that an individual shareholder is empowered to sue to
recover on behalf of the corporation for injury to the corporation).
237 Id. § 11.11, at 256 (stating that a controlling shareholder of a stock has a fiduciary
duty to both the corporation and the minority shareholders that can be breached by
neglecting or abusing shareholder rights).
238 See Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1978).
239 See, e.g., Belcher v. Schilling, 309 So. 2d 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
240 See Cox, supra note 157, § 15.01, at 416 (acknowledging the derivative suit as a
means "to redress by way of a shareholder's suit corporate wrongs").
241 Wessin v. Archives Corporation, 581 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
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Minnesota Court of Appeals stated that in distinguishing between direct and
derivative actions, courts must examine the nature of the shareholder's
claim as well as the relief that could result from the action if successful.
242
The court may consider, among other factors, "whether the injury results
from the plaintiffs other relationships with the corporation; whether the
alleged misconduct was specifically targeted toward the plaintiff' 243 or
whether the plaintiff is seeking only injunctive or prospective relief.
244
b. Board Authority as a Limitation
Although providing some protection, the success of derivative
proceedings is limited and, paradoxically, subject to the "approval" of the
board of directors. Once the complaint is filed, the corporation may
investigate the charges made in the complaint. If the corporation does so, it
may request a stay of further proceedings until the investigation is
complete. When the investigation is completed, the corporation may
determine that continued litigation is not in its best interests. In fact, even
after a derivative proceeding commences, directors have the opportunity to
prove the inconvenience of the proceeding and obtain a dismissal.24 5 Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado established general rules in connection with derivative
proceedings and the role of the board in determining the convenience of
such proceedings.24 6 In Zapata, the Supreme Court of Delaware stated that
a shareholder cannot sue on the corporation's behalf when the managing
body refuses.2 47 Such an action would constitute an invasion of the
discretionary field committed to the judgment of the directors, unless the
refusal is wrongful. 248 A committee composed of disinterested board
members can move to dismiss derivative litigation that is potentially
detrimental to the best interests of the corporation.249 The success of
derivative actions is certainly rare because so much power is given to the
discretionary business judgment of the directors. Still, courts remain
concerned over the enforcement of bona fide shareholders' rights.25 °
Consequently, derivative actions continue to be instruments of power for
the minority shareholders in a corporation. Generally, as the court stated in
242 Id. at 385 (inquiring into the nature of a derivative suit).
243 Id.
244 Id. (discussing the distinguishing factors between direct and derivative actions).
245 Id. (allowing directors an opportunity to demonstrate that a derivative proceeding is
not in the corporation's best interest).
246 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
247 Id. (describing the balance of power in a derivative suit).
248 id.
249 Id. (noting that a board decision to dismiss will be respected, unless deemed
wrongful).
250 Id. at 787.
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Zapata: "It thus appears desirable to find a balancing point where bona fide
shareholder power to bring corporate causes of action cannot be unfairly
trampled on by the board of directors, but the corporation can rid itself of
detrimental litigation. 251 If the derivative proceeding is not dismissed, the
court must approve any settlement or discontinuance of the action. The
court approval requirement is designed to prevent abuse of the privilege of
litigating on behalf of the corporation, to whom the plaintiff owes a duty
that is somewhat fiduciary.2 52
6. Direct Action
The basic distinction between a derivative suit and a direct action
depends upon whether the shareholder, or a group of shareholders, claims
an injury to the company or the violation of a personal right. In fact,
through a direct action, a shareholder, or a group of shareholders, can allege
direct injury by the company and therefore claim personal compensation.
As mentioned above, courts often have some difficulty in classifying a
plaintiff's claim as direct or derivative. However, the following actions
were deemed to be direct: an action to enforce the shareholder's voting
rights,25 a an action to compel the payment of dividends,2 54 and a suit to
protect a shareholder's inspection rights.2 55 Because of the tight procedural
rules required to bring a derivative suit, plaintiffs will usually prefer to have
their suit characterized as direct rather than derivative. There are reasons
that could persuade a plaintiff to choose a direct action instead of a
derivative suit. First, a direct action does not require the demand on the
board of directors. In a derivative suit the plaintiff is much more likely to
lose control of her action than when a direct action has been brought up
since the board of directors may investigate and recommend the termination
of the suit. Second, the distribution of the recovery is likely to be more
attractive to the plaintiff in a direct suit than in a derivative suit. In a
derivative suit the recovery is always by the company and the plaintiff
benefits only to the extent that her shares in the company (as well as the
shares of all the others shareholders) increase in value In a direct action, the
plaintiff has a direct and personal compensation.
251 Id.
252 See John E. Brenneis, Shareholders, Shareholders' Agreements, Meetings, and
Voting, CP FL-CLE 6-1.
253 See, e.g., Lochhead v. Alacano, 697 F. Supp. 406 (D. Utah 1988).
254 See, e.g., Independence Lead Mines Co. v. Kingsbury, 175 F.2d 983 (9th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 900 (1949).
255 See, e.g., Smith v. Flynn, 155 So. 2d 497 (Ala. 1963).
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7. Protection Under Federal Law: Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934
Rule lOb-5 is the "bedrock" of U.S. securities regulation. Most
securities transactions are under its protection and scrutiny at the same time.
For those involved in securities transactions, the rule guarantees that
relevant security information is not intentionally false or misleading. For
those who give securities information, the rule imposes standards of
complete honesty and disclosure that carry risks of significant liability.
Section 10 (b) of the Exchange Act does not specify a private remedy for
violations of its rules but, despite the absence of a statutory mandate, it is
now beyond question that Rule lOb-5 implies a private cause of action. s
Such claims can be brought only in federal district courts, which have
exclusive jurisdiction over actions under the 1934 Exchange Act.257 Rule
lOb-5 is also an effective tool in SEC enforcement actions. In fact, section
21 of the Exchange Act confers to the SEC extensive enforcement powers
to sue before a federal court to prohibit violations of securities rules,
including Rule lOb-5. The SEC can initiate only civil and administrative
proceedings to investigate potential violations, and to rectify past and
prevent future violations while the Department of Justice has sole
jurisdiction over criminal proceedings.
Rule 1 Ob-5(c) states that it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, to "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," "to make
any untrue statements of a material fact or to omit stating a material fact
necessary to make the statements. .. not misleading," or "to engage in any
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security. 258
Rule 1 Ob-5 is basically an anti-fraud provision. It was adopted by the
SEC under the authority of section 10 of the Exchange Act, which was
designed to prohibit "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance,"
and two of its three operative clauses are based on the concept of "fraud" or
"deceit." 259 The Supreme Court has held that no person can be found to
have violated Rule I Ob-5, in either an SEC or a private action, unless he is
shown to have acted with "scienter." 260 The scienter requirement, in the
256 See Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (first case that
recognized a private 1 Ob-5 action); Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (confirming the existence of a private action).
257 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk, §78j (2000).
258 15 U.S.C. § 78j (a)(1).
259 Thomas Lee Hazen, The Jurisprudence of SEC Rule lOb-5, SK003 ALI-ABA 443
(2004).
260 Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976).
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view of some courts, does not require that the person act willfully, but may
be met by showing that she or he acted recklessly.
2 61
Since the SEC's rule-making power under section 10(b) is to be
exercised "for the protection of investors," it can be argued that the only
persons entitled to the protection of Rule 1Ob-5 are those who can be
classified as "investors." However, the definition has been stretched in a
number of ways such that shareholders are also considered included in it.
262
While the fraud must be "in connection with the purchase or sale," the fraud
need not relate to the terms of the transaction. In Superintendent of
Insurance v. Bankers Life,2 63 the Supreme Court held unanimously that
"since there was a 'sale' of a security and since fraud was used 'in
connection with' it, there is redress under § 10(b), whatever might be
available as a remedy under state law., 264 Subsequent lower court decisions
have read this decision narrowly, holding that the fraud must have infected
the securities transaction itself, rather than merely involving a
misappropriation of the proceeds, 265 and that there is no liability when there
is a substantial time gap or no direct causal link between the sale and the
alleged fraud.266
The most important extension of the "in connection with" language
came in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur.26 7 In that case, the Second Circuit
held that misstatements in a press release issued by a publicly-held
corporation, which was not at the time engaged in buying or selling any of
its own shares, violated Rule I Ob-5 because they were made "in connection
with" the purchases and sales being made by shareholders in the open
market. This holding has formed the basis for a large number of shareholder
class actions alleging damages suffered because of misstatements in a
company's reports or press releases. The Second Circuit further expanded
the concept with its decision in In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Securities
Litigation, 68 where it held that technical advertisements in a medical
journal could be considered "in connection with the purchase or sale" of a
security. Courts consider the issuance by a corporation of its own shares as
261 See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977).
262 See, e.g., Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960) (this
decision is important as the basis for a large number of derivative actions in which
shareholders have alleged that management or controlling shareholders defrauded the
corporation).
263 Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
21 Id. at 12.
265 See In re Investors Funding Corp., 523 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
266 See Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Rochelle v. Marine
Midland Grace Trust Co. of N.Y., 535 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1976).
267 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
268 In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Securities Litigation, 150 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
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a "sale" under Rule 1 Ob-5. 26
9
In its first decision interpreting Rule 1 Ob-5, the Supreme Court held
that a merger involved a "sale" of stock of the disappearing company and a
"purchase" of the stock of the surviving company for the purposes of the
rule.270 The Supreme Court has held that a pledge of securities is a "sale"
for purposes of the Securities Act of 1933, since Securities Act § 2(a)(3)
defines "sale" to include "every contract of sale or disposition of a security
or interest in a security, for value., 27 1 The Supreme Court has stated that an
oral option can support a Rule lOb-5 claim even if the defendant never had
the intent to follow through on the underlying securities transaction. 72
A fundamental aspect of Rule 1 Ob-5 liability is the potential for private
class actions, i.e., securities fraud class actions. There are six common
models of Rule lOb-5 actions: (1) securities trading, in which a party to a
security transaction gives false or misleading information to persuade the
other party to enter into the transaction, or remains silent when she has a
duty to disclose; (2) corporate trading, in which a corporate manager
induces her company to enter into a disadvantageous securities transaction
(the company or a shareholder on behalf of the company sues the manager);
(3) corporate disclosures, in which a company issues false or misleading
information to the public about its securities, or it remains silent when it has
a duty to disclose213 (purchasers or sellers, frequently in a class action, sue
the company for their losses caused by the trading); (4) insider trading, in
which company insiders either use confidential company information to
enter into securities transactions or give the information to others who, even
though knowing the confidentiality of it, trade on the basis of that
information (traders sue the insiders and their tippees); (5) outsider trading,
in which outsiders with no relationship to the company use confidential
information about the company entrusted to them by others and trade on the
basis of this information (traders, as well as the holders of the confidential
information, sue the outsiders); and (6) customer-broker disputes, in which
securities professionals engage in deceptive or other unprofessional conduct
in connection with securities trading by or for their customers (the
customers file claims against the broker and their firms). All of the Rule
lOb-5 models have a common issue, i.e., that securities trades were based
on an informational asymmetry, involving deception or other unfairness,
between parties.
269 See Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960).
270 See SEC v. Nat'l Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
271 See Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
272 See Wharf Holdings v. United Int'l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588 (2001).
273 This is essentially what happened in the Parmalat case, in which the management
never disclosed the bad financial situation of the company to shareholders and investors in
order to conceal the perpetrated fraud.
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Material omissions and misrepresentations, and insider trading are the
two types of fraud that under Rule 1 Ob-5 can be a basis for a securities
violation, and therefore for a securities fraud action. The elements of the
fraud and the burden of proof for the plaintiff in a securities fraud action are
described below.
C. The Role of the SEC
The SEC's main duty is to protect investors and ensure the integrity of
the securities market. To carry out this mandate under the federal securities
laws the SEC has broad investigatory and enforcement powers.
1. Investigatory powers
The SEC has investigatory powers in various situations.274 SEC
investigations, both formal and informal, are not public. However, the SEC
has duties under the Freedom of Information Act to release documents and
other information. The SEC also reports the results of certain investigations.
Therefore, a SEC investigation may likely become public and be relevant,
or even decisive, in subsequent civil or criminal proceedings. SEC staff
may conduct informal investigations without a formal SEC order. If an
informal investigation suggests that further information is needed, the SEC
can issue a formal order of investigation indicating the scope of the inquiry.
Once a formal order of investigation has been issued, SEC staff can issue
subpoenas nationwide against any person who has information significant
to the investigation.275 If a person refuses to comply with the subpoena, the
SEC staff must apply to the federal district court to enforce it. 76 Courts
have held that the SEC does not need to prove probable cause that the
securities laws have been violated; it is deemed enough that the
investigation is for a proper purpose and the information sought is relevant
to that purpose. 277 Once the staff has completed its investigation, it must
return to the Commission for permission to institute, if necessary, any
enforcement action. However, the SEC, without taking any formal
enforcement action after an investigation, can issue a "§ 21 (a) report" of
274 As established, for instance, in Securities Act § 8(e) (that determines whether to issue
an order stopping registration of a public offering), in Securities Act § 19 (b) (enforcement
of the Securities Act), and in Exchange Act § 21(a) (determining whether there has been a
violation of the Exchange Act and its rules).
275 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 19(b), 2 1(a) (2000) (both sections
empower the SEC to administer oaths, subpoena witnesses, and require production of
documents that the SEC deems relevant to the inquiry).276 Id. § 21(c).
277 See SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1973). See also
SEC v. Blackfoot Bituminous, Inc., 622 F.2d 512, 514 (1980).
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the investigation.278 Even though the report does not require any sanction, a
negative comment about the target may result in deterrence and
punishment.
2. Administrative Proceedings
SEC administrative proceedings are heard either by administrative law
judges or the Commission itself and allow the SEC to impose sanctions to
protect the public interest. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 confers
upon the SEC the authority to impose administrative sanctions 279 if the SEC
concludes, based upon a preponderance of evidence, that a violation of
federal securities laws occurred. Before 1990, SEC tools to remedy
securities law violations were limited to court applied sanctions, including
injunctions and the disgorgement of illegal profits. 28" However, the
Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990281
gave the SEC administrative power to issue monetary penalties, cease and
desist orders in response to violations of federal securities laws, and to bar a
violator of securities laws from serving as an officer or director of a
publicly held venture.282 These SEC sanctions are subject to the federal five
year limitation period, which requires application within five years of the
violation.2 83
a. Cease and Desist Authority
Under the SEC's cease and desist authority, the agency may prohibit a
person or business from continuing a particular course of conduct after the
agency shows the target has engaged in a violation of federal securities
laws. 284 The SEC may issue temporary and permanent cease and desist
orders against regulated persons.2 5 The standard for issuing a cease and
278 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 21(a).
279 Id. § 15(b)(4)1.
280 See Matthew S. Morris, The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock
Reform Act Of 1990: By Keeping Up With the Joneses, the SEC's Enforcement Arsenal Is
Modernized, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 151, 166 n. 67 (1993) (citing Dennis J. Block and Nancy
E. Barton, SEC Enforcement Actions-Time for the Self-Dissolving Injunction, 11 SEC. REG.
L.J. 163 (1983)).
281 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1997).
282 Administrative proceedings include: stop order proceedings under § 8 of the 1933
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (d)-(e); proceedings against broker-dealers under § 15(c)(4) of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4); proceedings against investment advisors, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
3(e), and investment companies, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(e); and sanctions against attorneys,
accountants, and other professionals practicing before the SEC, pursuant to Rule 2(e) of the
Commission's Rules of Practice.
283 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1994).
211 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (1994).
285 Id. (adding new § 8A to the 1933 Act); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (2000) (adding new § 21C
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desist order is the likelihood of "significant dissipation or conversion of
assets, significant harm to investors, or substantial harm to the public
interest.''116 Cease and desist orders require notice and opportunity for a
hearing, unless the order is temporary and such notice and opportunity
would be impracticable or contrary to the public interest . 87
b. Monetary Penalties in Administrative Proceedings
The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of
1990 gives the SEC the power to impose monetary penalties, including
fines and disgorgement, against securities professionals if it finds, after a
formal hearing, that the penalty is in the public interest and the person
willfully violated federal securities laws.289 These penalties are applied on a
three-tier scale that looks at the nature of the crime and the potential for
harm from the actions.290 Generally, the more egregious the violation, the
greater the fine imposed.
3. Civil Remedies
The SEC has the authority to petition the court to grant injunctions,
monetary penalties, and to disgorge illegal profits against an entity that
violates federal securities laws. W Unlike administrative proceedings, where
the agency or administrative law judge adjudicates claims, the SEC files
these actions in a federal district court, which has broad equitable discretion
to craft a remedy under the 1934 Securities Act.
292
a. Injunctive Actions and Ancillary Measures
The SEC has historically used injunctions as one of its 9principle
enforcement tools and may seek discretionary injunctive relief2  against
both the perpetrators of securities fraud and those who aid and abet
violators of securities laws.294 Injunctive relief is designed, not to punish,
to the 1934 Act).
286 Id. §§ 77h-l(c)(1), 78u-3(c)(1) (1994).
287 Id.
288 The 1990 Act authorizes the SEC to require accounting and disgorgement in
administrative proceedings where the SEC has the power to impose monetary penalties. 15
U.S.C. §§ 78u-2(a-b), (e), 80a-9(e), 80b-3(j) (1994).
289 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-2(a), 80b-3(i) (1994).
290 RALPH C. FERRARA & MARK I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES PRACTICE, FEDERAL AND
STATE ENFORCEMENT §§ 4:16.50, 5a: 10 (1998).
291 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 (1994).
292 See SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing court's broad
equitable discretion).
293 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1994).
294 In SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1996), the court ruled that, under the
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but to deter individuals from future violations of federal securities laws.
Injunctions may be temporary or permanent,295 and the SEC may request
temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in emergency
situations. In order to receive injunctive relief, the SEC must offer
positive proof of the likelihood of further violations.297 Factors considered
by the court in finding a risk of future violations include (1) the severity of
the violations, 298 (2) the degree of scienter involved, (3) the defendant's
recognition of the wrongful nature of his conduct,299 and (4) his sincerity in
refraining from future violations. Any failure to cooperate with the SEC to
remedy the violations may suggest a propensity to engage in future
violations. 0 Consideration of hardship and equitable factors may be
appropriate as well 30 1 but the court must balance such factors against the
public's interest in preventing future violations. In the end, the court will
require the SEC to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that a
defendant is likely to engage in the forbidden activity before granting an
injunction.30 2 Additionally, courts have the power to bar securities law
violators from serving as officers or directors of public companies 30 3 and to
bar their future association with securities brokers or dealers.30 4 The 1990
Act provides that a court may enter an order barring or suspending an
officer or director of a company if the SEC has brought an injunctive
305action.
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 104, 109 Stat. 737
(1995) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78t(f)), the SEC can bring injunctive actions against those
who aid and abet securities violations. In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit held that Central Bank
v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), which barred private actions against those who
aid and abet securities violations, did not extend to the SEC. Fehn, 97 F.3d at 1280.
295 See Fehn, 97 F.3d at 1295 (requiring SEC to show "reasonable likelihood" of future
violations for permanent injunction).
296 Preliminary injunctions are appropriate if the SEC makes a "substantial showing of a
likelihood of success as to both a current violation and the risk of repetition." SEC v.
Cavanagh, 155 F.3d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
297 See Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276 (stating that "the SEC had the burden of proving there was a
reasonable likelihood of future violations of the securities laws").
298 See SEC v. Lorin, 76 F.3d 458, 461 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that defendant's "frequent
and egregious" violations and persistent refusal to admit to wrong-doing indicated
"propensity for future violations").
299 Id. at 461 (including refusal to recognize wrongdoing among factors to consider as
indication of likelihood of future violations).
300 See Cavanagh, 155 F.3d at 135 (describing factors court looks to before granting an
injunction).
301 See SEC v. AMX Int'l, Inc., 7 F.3d 71, 73 (5th Cir. 1993) ("financial inability is a
defense for failure to comply with a court-ordered disgorgement").
302 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
303 Id. § 77t(e) (1994).
304 Id. §§ 78o(b)(6)(A)(ii), (iii) (1994).
305 Id. §§ 77t, 78u(d)(2).
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The SEC may also seek ancillary relief in addition to injunctions,
including appointment of a receiver.3 °6 The SEC's power to seek ancillary
relief is extensive; in fashioning the relief the SEC need only satisfy one
requirement: that the measure is appropriate to protect investors and
effectuate the purposes of federal securities laws.
b. Disgorgement and Monetary Penalties
Disgorgement is an equitable remedy that returns profits that a
defendant received through the securities fraud.307 The primary purpose of
this remedy is to discourage securities law violations "by depriving
violators of ill-gotten gains" and the prevention of unjust enrichment; it is
typically not used for restitution. 30  The court need not find that the
defendant is likely to violate securities laws in the future, only that the he
"has no right to retain the funds illegally taken from the victims."309 Once
the profits have been disgorged, it remains in the court's discretion to
determine how the money is distributed.310 There is no requirement that the
SEC return these funds to those harmed by the transaction or that the court
tie the level of the penalty to the losses suffered.3 l l If the SEC demonstrates
that the defendant has violated either the securities laws or a cease and
desist order the court shall have the power to impose civil monetary
penalties on the person committing the violation.312 These penalties are
applied on the basis of the three-tiered structure that examines the nature of
the crime and the potential for harm from the actions.31 3 These monetary
penalties are similar to the monetary penalties the SEC may apply in
administrative actions.
4. Criminal Enforcement
Willful violations of the substantive provisions of the principal
306 See SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 830 F.2d 431, 436 (2d Cir. 1987)
(acknowledging that neither the 1933 Act nor the 1934 Act explicitly gives courts power to
appoint a receiver, but stating "courts have consistently held such power exists").
307 See SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding where stock purchased on
basis of insider information, proper measure of damages is difference between the price paid
and the price shortly after disclosure of information).
308 See Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d at 175 (stating primary purpose of disgorgement is
prevention of unjust enrichment).
309 SEC v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 679 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating requirement court find
future violations likely only applies to permanent injunctions).
310 See SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing purpose of
disgorgement purpose).
311 Id. at 175-76 (discussing disgorgement payment theories). But in some cases the SEC
may decide that returning the disgorged profits to the investors is appropriate.
312 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 (1994).
313 Id. §§ 77t(d)(2)(A)-(C).
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securities laws, including the registration and fraud provisions, are a
criminal offense.314 The Commission has broad subpoena powers which it
delegates to members of its staff to investigate apparent violations of the
federal securities laws. 315 Commission subpoenas, however, can be
enforced only by a court and one is not in contempt until he has refused to
respond to a court order enforcing the subpoena. 316 The Commission's
investigation may result from complaints made by investors or, as is more
often the case, as a result of the initiative of its staff. Upon conclusion of an
investigation, the Commission may refer the matter to the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") with a recommendation that certain persons be indicted and
prosecuted. If the DOJ follows the recommendation, the matter will be
referred to a grand jury and, assuming indictment, it will be prosecuted by
the U.S. Attorney. The DOJ may separately or in coordination with the SEC
conduct investigations leading to criminal prosecutions that include
securities fraud counts. It happens frequently that the DOJ acts with the
guidance and in response to SEC reports. Moreover, it is quite common for
SEC staff to be assigned to the DOJ to assist in the preparation of the case
for trial. This kind of effort often results in the creation of a Task Force.
a. Contempt Proceedings
The injunction is one of the most effective and important tools in the
SEC's enforcement arsenal and a defendant who violates the terms of an
SEC injunction will likely face criminal or civil contempt proceedings.
When faced with the need to initiate a contempt action, the SEC must
choose between initiating a civil or criminal action. The main purpose
behind an SEC contempt action is enforcement of the injunction, not
necessarily punishment of the violator; thus, when possible the SEC prefers
to initiate civil rather than criminal contempt proceedings.31 v Criminal
contempt proceedings are designed to force the party to follow the orders of
the court issuing the injunction. Unlike other criminal penalties, the SEC
may bring criminal contempt proceeding in court under Rule 42(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure without DOJ intervention. This
provides the SEC with significant power to compel compliance with
injunctions. Another difference between original criminal prosecution and
prosecution for contempt is the severity of the penalty imposed. The 1933
and 1934 Acts limit the number of years of imprisonment for criminal
violations of their provisions.3 18 In contrast, the judge's discretion
314 15 U.S.C. § 24; 15 U.S.C. § 32.
315 15 U.S.C. § 19(b); 15 U.S.C. § 21(a).
316 See 2 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 871 (2005).
317 STEINBERG, supra note 290, § 6:20.
318 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1994) (five-year limitation under 1933 Act); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a)
(1994) (10-year limitation under 1934 Act).
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determines the sentence for a defendant guilty of contempt. 319 Civil
contempt sanctions are remedial rather than punitive and serve one of two
functions: (1) "to compensate the party injured as a result of the violation of
the injunction, or (2) to coerce compliance with the injunction terms. 3 20 If
the SEC decides that criminal contempt proceedings are not needed, a court
may issue an order of civil contempt, enforceable by fine or arrest, for
willful disobedience of a specific order of the court.321 Foreign citizens
convicted of violating the securities laws also risk the imposition of
injunctions and contempt orders; the SEC may seek assistance from the
relevant foreign court for enforcement.322
V. WHAT PROTECTIONS WOULD HAVE EXISTED FOR THE
PARMALAT MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IF PARMALAT HAD
BEEN A U.S. LISTED COMPANY?
A. Action to Recover Damages
1. The Rule 1Ob-5 Action
It is undisputed that Parmalat engaged in one of the largest and most
brazen corporate financial frauds in history. Investors bought and kept
Parmalat shares, confident in the information disclosed by the company.
Most would have likely not purchased those shares if they had known that
the company was issuing false information about its securities and hiding
the truth. Rule 1Ob-5 of the 1934 Act offers defrauded investors in the
United States a remedy to recover damages suffered when the fraud is
determined to be a material omission or misrepresentation, which is what
occured in the Parmalat case.
In order to state a cause of action under Rule I Ob-5, a private plaintiff
must allege each of the following elements: (a) the plaintiff is a purchaser
or seller of a security; (b) defendant made a material misrepresentation or
319 See United States v. Corn, 836 F.2d 889, 891-92 (5th Cir. 1988) (punishing violation
of injunction prohibiting illegal trading in securities with five-year prison term and
restitution to victims of securities fraud, but entitling defendant to warning of possibility of
restitution before pleading guilty).
320 STEINBERG, supra note 290, § 6:20.
321 See Levine v. Comcoa, Ltd., 70 F.3d 1191, 1194 (11 th Cir. 1995) (upholding civil
contempt order against defendant's attorney for violating temporary restraining order against
transferring client's funds even though order had lapsed).
322 See SEC v. Int'l Swiss Inv. Corp., 895 F.2d 1272, 1276 (enjoining defendants,
residents of Mexico, from further sale of unregistered securities in the United States and
holding defendants in contempt, freezing their assets, and ordering accounting).
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omission.; (c) the misrepresentation or omission was "in connection" with
the purchase or sale of the security; (d) defendant's misrepresentation or
omission caused plaintiffs loss; (e) the plaintiff relied on defendant's
misrepresentation or omission; (f) defendant acted with the requisite
scienter; and (g) plaintiff suffered damages from the harm.
A material misstatement is a misrepresentation or omission of a
material fact that, in light of the circumstances under which it was made, is
misleading. The Supreme Court stated that "an omitted fact is material if
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important" in making an investment decision.323 The Supreme
Court has stated that
To fulfill the materiality requirement there must be a substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having altered the total mix of
information made available. An omission is actionable under the
securities laws only when there is a duty to disclose the allegedly
omitted information,
324
or the alleged omissions render an affirmative statement misleading.325
To give rise to liability, the misrepresentation or omission must be
made "in connection with" the purchase or sale of a security. The element
of causation helps ensure that Rule 1Ob-5 does not become "an insurance
plan for the cost of every security purchased in reliance upon a material
misstatement or omission., 326 Both "loss causation" and "transaction
causation" are necessary for a lOb-5 claim. Transaction causation has been
characterized as a type of "causation in fact" or "but for" causation. It
requires the plaintiff to make a showing that the violations in question
caused plaintiff to engage in the transaction.327 Loss causation is often
referred to as "proximate causation" or "legal causation." It involves a
"determination that the harm suffered by the investor 'flowed' from the
323 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
324 See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,239 n.17 (1988).
325 See Glazer v. Formica Corp., 964 F.2d 149, 157 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Time Warner
Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that when a corporation is pursuing
a specific goal and announces that goal as well as an intended approach for reaching that
goal, the corporation may come under an obligation to disclose other approaches of reaching
the goal when those approaches are under active and serious consideration).
326 Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd in part
on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
327 Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 259 F.3d 154, 172 (3d Cir. 2001); Suez Equity Investors,
L.P. v. Toronto Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 95-96 (2d Cir. 2001).




A plaintiff must rely on the alleged material misstatement in making
the investment decision; reliance is a "critical element for recovery under
1Ob-5., 329 Reliance generally requires that the plaintiff knew of the
misrepresentation at issue, believed it to be true, and because of that
knowledge and belief, purchased or sold the security in question.
330
Reliance by the plaintiff generally will be presumed based on the "fraud on
the market" doctrine. Under that doctrine, investors do not have to prove
individual reliance on a company's false or misleading statements. Instead,
the doctrine creates a rebuttable presumption that plaintiff relied on the
integrity of the market and was defrauded even if he did not rely
specifically on the false or misleading statements at issue in the complaint.
The key to the "fraud on the market" theory is that "in an open and
developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is determined
by the available material information regarding the company and its
business .... Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of
stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements. 331
In a securities fraud action, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant
acted with "scienter," i.e., intent to defraud.33 2 The Supreme Court in Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder defined scienter as "a mental state embracing intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud" but did not decide whether recklessness
satisfied the scienter requirement under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.333
Courts in every federal circuit, however, have found that a sufficient
showing of recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement. 334 The circuits
differ, though, on how they define "recklessness" and on the type of
conduct sufficient to qualify as evidence of scienter.
A private cause of action under Rule I Ob-5 is implied. Therefore, until
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), courts
had no statutory guidance to determine the appropriate measure of damages.
The result was uncertainty concerning the method to calculate damages
because factors other than the information in dispute can impact stock price.
One of the stated purposes of the PSLRA was to provide statutory guidance
regarding the calculation of damages in securities fraud cases. The PSLRA
328 See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1974).
329 Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
180 (1994).
330 See Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 413 (5th Cir. 2001).
331 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988).
332 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
333 Id. at 194 n.12.
334 See, e.g., Aldridge v. A.T. Cross Corp., 284 F.3d 72, 78-84 (1st Cir. 2002); Novak v.
Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 310-13 (2d Cir. 2000); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525,
534 (3d Cir. 1999); Abrams v. Baker Hughes Inc., 292 F.3d 424, 430-32 (5th Cir. 2002).
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attempts to address the uncertainty of damage calculations by adopting the
90-day "look back" or "bounce back" period. This "look back" or "bounce
back" period seeks to limit damages to those losses caused by the
defendant's fraud and not by other market conditions. Therefore, damages
under section 10(b) are limited to the difference between the price paid or
received by the plaintiff and the mean trading price during either the 90
days after a disclosure is made correcting the false statement in question or
the date on which the plaintiff sells or repurchases the security, whichever
is earlier. 335 A plaintiff in a Rule 1Ob-5 cause of action has the burden of• 336
proving damages. Under the PSLRA, a plaintiff has the additional burden
of proving that the defendant's wrongful act or omission caused the
plaintiffs loss.
337
The federal statute of limitations applicable to securities claims was
amended by section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.338 Section 804
provides that the statute of limitations is either two years after discovery of
the facts constituting a violation of the securities laws or five years after
such a violation occurs, whichever is earlier.339 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
extended the statute of limitations established in the Supreme Court's 1991
decision in Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson340 and
left intact by the PSLRA.
Securities claims are often brought as class actions under the Securities
Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against corporate insiders
and their outside professionals. Typically, in the class action context,
securities claims are brought on behalf of the purchasers of a particular
security with respect to a specified "Class Period" during which defendants
are alleged to have caused the price of the security to be "artificially
inflated." In such actions, accountants may be named as defendants, along
with the issuer, officers and directors, underwriters and others involved in
the process of issuing securities or making statements (either in press
releases or documents filed with the SEC) that affect the value of the
securities in the open market. In Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank,3 a1 the Supreme Court held that a private plaintiff may not maintain an
... 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (1994).
336 See Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 1982); Feldman v. Pioneer
Petroleum, Inc., 813 F.2d 296, 302 (10th Cir. 1987); Pelletier v. Stuart-James Co., 863 F.2d
1550, 1558 (1 lth Cir. 1989).
311 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (1994).
311 Pub. L. No. 107-204, §804, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (166 Stat.) 745.
339 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 804(b).
340 Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991)
(holding that actions under section 10(b) and Rule I Ob-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act must be commenced within one year after discovery of the facts constituting the
violation and in no event more than three years after such violation).
341 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).
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aiding and abetting action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, bringing an end to a 30-year line of authority to the contrary.
As the Supreme Court made clear, however, professionals such as
accountants and lawyers still remain subject to liability when acting as
primary violators of the securities laws. The Supreme Court in fact stated
that
any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who
employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or
omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be
liable as a primary violator under 10b-5, assuming all of the
requirements for primary liability under Rule lOb-5 are met. In any
complex securities fraud, moreover, there are likely to be multiple
violators.342
This observation follows directly from the wording of Rule lOb-5, which
holds liable any person who, directly or indirectly, violates the substantive
provisions of the rule. This means that any person who makes false or
misleading statements and induces others to trade to their detriment can be
liable. Significantly, corporate officials who make statements about the
company or its securities expose the company to 1Ob-5 liability, even if the
company does not trade in its own stock. This statement, the so-called
"primary violator standard," allows shareholders to sue not only the
directors of the company, but also the accountants, lawyers, and
underwriters.
In actions brought against accountants pursuant to the securities laws,
plaintiffs typically allege that the auditors misrepresented that the audit was
conducted in accordance with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards
("GAAS")3 43 and that the financial statements were prepared in conformity
with GAASP. Accountants named as defendants in securities class actions
are thus almost always charged with making a false statement.3" The
PSLRA, reversing, for SEC actions only, part of the effect of the decision in
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank. It established that for SEC
Actions under the 1934 Act, any person who knowingly provides
substantial assistance to a violator shall be deemed in violation.34 5 The
PSLRA also reversed traditional joint and several liability standards for
342 Id.
343 GAAS is a set of systematic guidelines used by auditors when conducting audits on
companies' finances, ensuring the accuracy, consistency and verifiability of auditors' actions
and reports. By relying on GAAS, auditors can minimize the probability of missing material
information.
344 See Sanford P. Dumain, Class Action Suits, Auditor Liability, and the Effect of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in SK086 ALI-ABA 501 (2005)
141 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (1994).
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claims based on "non-knowing" conduct against outside directors under
section 11 of the 1933 Act and against all persons for claims under the 1934
Act. The proportionate liability of each such defendant found liable based
on his or her non-knowing conduct is determined by the jury's answers to
special interrogatories, based on the nature of the misconduct and the causal
relationship attributable to each defendant.34 6
2. Private Securities Fraud Class Action
A private securities fraud class action is a lawsuit in which a
shareholder, or a small group of shareholders who have lost money based
upon misleading statements by the company, represent the interests of a
larger group of shareholders. In a case such as Parmalat, in which a huge
number of shareholders had been defrauded and injured, a securities fraud
class action seems to be the right remedy for recovery. As noted by
Thompson and Sale, the securities fraud class actions brought in recent
years follow a typical pattern. 347 These cases are brought under the federal
securities laws mainly after a company's correction of a prior earning's
misstatement. When the new earnings numbers are disclosed, as a
consequence, the company's stock price drops. The stock price fall
corresponds to the alleged damages. What happened in the Parmalat case
was much more than a misstatement. In fact, as illustrated above, the
majority shareholder and the management withheld facts that would have
convinced shareholders to sell or not to continue purchasing Parmalat
shares. Once the true situation of the company had been disclosed, the
company's stock price dramatically dropped.
From the filing of the first complaint to the challenge of the pleadings,
the long haul of discovery and ultimately settlement or trial, securities class
actions must follow a specific procedure. First of all, under the PSLRA,
where multiple plaintiffs have filed suits against the same defendants, the
court is required to appoint the "most adequate plaintiff' as lead plaintiff for
the consolidated actions. 48 The PSLRA changed the standards and
procedures for selecting the lead plaintiff in securities class actions in order
to eliminate abuses involving the use of "professional plaintiffs" and the
race to the courthouse to file the complaint. Prior to the enactment of the
PSLRA, courts generally selected as lead plaintiff the first plaintiff to file
suit. The PSLRA sought to eliminate that practice by directing the court to
appoint as lead plaintiff the member or members of the purported plaintiff
class that the court determines to be most capable of adequately
346 Id. § 78u-4(g) (1994).
347 Robert. B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as a Corporate
Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 888 (2003).
348 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(a)(3)(B)(i) (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (1994).
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representing the interests of class members. In addition, the PSLRA
requires that the plaintiff in the first-filed action publish a notice advising of
the pendency of the action so that any member of the proposed class can
come forward and move to serve as lead plaintiff.
3 49
In a case where more than one complaint has been filed, or a putative
class member moves for appointment as lead plaintiff, the PSLRA further
provides that the court "shall adopt a presumption that the most adequate
plaintiff' is that person or group of persons possessing the largest financial
interest in the relief sought and satisfies the requirements of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure Rule 23.350 This presumption may be rebutted by proof
that the most adequate plaintiff will not fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class or is subject to unique defenses that render such
plaintiff incapable of adequately representing the class. This presumption,
however, is not rebutted simply because the plaintiff is unable to assert all
of the claims brought by the class. That is, under the PSLRA, the selection
of lead plaintiff is premised on the loss suffered, "not on ... the most
adequate complaint filed."3 5' Courts, in some cases, have appointed the
single investor with the greatest individual loss who has otherwise satisfied
the statutory criteria.352 In other cases, courts have rejected the plaintiff
with the largest financial loss for a more adequate plaintiff.353 Although
Congress intended that the lead plaintiff provisions of the PSLRA result in
an increased role for institutional investors as plaintiffs, non-institutional
investors have continued to dominate as lead plaintiffs in post-PSLRA
cases. 354 The PSLRA provides that, "[t]he most adequate plaintiff shall,
subject to the approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent
the class. 355 The PSLRA's intent was to place greater control of the
litigation in the hands of investors, rather than those of plaintiffs.
The motion to dismiss has taken on greater significance in PSLRA
341 Id. § 77z-I(a)(3)(A)(i)(II) (1994); 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i)(Il) (1994).
350 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (1994).
The class representative must establish, among other things, that: (1) common questions of
law or fact predominate in the claims raised by the various members (the commonality
requirement) and (2) the claim of the class representative is sufficiently typical of those of
the class generally to conclude she is an appropriate representative (the typicality
requirement).
351 In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 219 F.R.D. 267, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
352 See, e.g., Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp., 188 F.R.D. 577, 586-87 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(rejecting lead plaintiff application from aggregation of investors in favor of single investor
with greatest individual losses).
353 See In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. 427, 455-59 (S.D. Tex. 2002). See
generally In re Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 447 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
354 See P. Saparoff et al., The Role of the Institutional Investors Class Actions Under the
PSLRA--Are They Walking on a Slippery Slope? One Year Later, Securities Reform Act
Litigation Reporter, June 1998.
311 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(a)(3)(B)(v) (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v) (1994).
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securities class actions because cases not dismissed at the pleadings stage
require defendants to face a long and expensive discovery process. Given
the breadth of the issues, the large sum of money at stake, and the
concomitant expense and burden of the discovery process on the defendants
in securities litigation, cases that are not dismissed on their pleadings
almost inevitably lead to large document productions and the distraction of
senior management with internal fact investigations and depositions.
Expense and delay are the types of substantial burdens plaintiffs count on to
broker settlements. Dismissing the case at the outset is one of the few ways
defendants can avoid this burden. It is quite clear, though, that the
defendants have a strong interest in filing a motion to dismiss.
The PSLRA heightens securities fraud pleading requirements in two
ways. First, the complaint must set forth "each statement alleged to have
been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading,
and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on
information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts
on which that belief is formed., 356 Second, plaintiffs must state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind and must do so with respect to each act or
omission alleged to be a violation of the securities laws.
The PSLRA mandates dismissal, upon motion of the defendant, if the
complaint fails to meet these requirements.358 All discovery and other
proceedings must be stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss,
unless the court finds upon motion of any party that particularized
discovery is necessary to preserve evidence. 359 This statutory prohibition is
meant in part to prevent a situation in which a plaintiff sues without
possessing the requisite information to satisfy the PSLRA's heightened
pleading requirements and then uses discovery to acquire that information
to "resuscitate an otherwise dismissable complaint.,
360
Although class certification is rarely defeated in its entirety in a
securities action, the size and definition of the class is ripe for early
discovery and litigation, and is of particular importance to defendants
because class size and class definition impact the magnitude of the
plaintiffs' alleged damages. If a defendant is able to limit the size of the
class (e.g., by rebutting the presumption of reliance for one or more subsets
of the class or by shortening the class period), the damages-and the
settlement value---of the case may be dramatically reduced. Accordingly,
class certification can be a critical battleground for securities litigation
356 Id. § 78u-4(b)(l)(B) (1994).
117 Id. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1994).
358 Id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A) (1994).
151 Id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (1994).
360 In re Comdisco Sec. Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1263 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
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defendants.36 1
The party seeking class certification bears the burden of demonstrating
that each of the four requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)
are met in addition to at least one of the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b). The court must conduct a "rigorous analysis" to
determine whether the party seeking certification has met the prerequisites
of Rule 23, which are (1) numerosity; (2) commonality, as a precondition of
certification, in which there must be questions of law and fact common to
the class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members; (3) adequacy of representation by lead plaintiff and his counsel,
which requires that the class representatives do not "have interests
antagonistic to those of the class," and are "the plaintiffs [who] will
vigorously pursue the litigation on behalf of the class and their chosen
attorney must be qualified, experienced, and able to conduct the
litigation;', 362 (4) typicality, it requires that the class representatives'
interests be aligned with those of the class so that the named plaintiffs'
claim truly represents those of absent class members. The individual
circumstances, claims, and defenses of the class representative should not
differ significantly from the class as a whole but the claims need not be
identical.3 63
The court, in deciding on class certification, may not decide the merits
of plaintiffs' claims, but may address them only insofar as they concern
class certification. To test a plaintiff's assertions concerning the propriety of
class certification, defendants should seek discovery of the representative
plaintiff with respect to whether the requirements of Rule 23 will be met.364
In any private action arising under this chapter, all discovery and other
proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss,
unless the court finds upon the motion of any party that particularized
discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to
that party.
365
Settlement is strongly favored, particularly in complex class actions, to
minimize potential litigation costs and reduce the strain on judicial
361 See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978) ("Certification of a
large class may so increase the defendant's potential damages liability and litigation costs
that he may find it economically prudent to settle and to abandon a meritorious defense.")
362 Scholes v. Tomlinson, 145 F.R.D. 485, 490 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
363 See Realmonte v. Reeves, 169 F.3d 1280, 1286-87 (10th Cir. 1999).
364 See Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508-09 (9th Cir. 1992) (analyzing
named plaintiffs investment history to determine propriety as a named plaintiff in a
securities case); see also Degulis v. LRX Biotechnology, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 123 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (finding that discovery of named plaintiff's investment records, sophistication, and
trading strategies was relevant to pending class certification motions).
365 See Hanon, 976 F.2d at 508-09. See also Degulis, 176 F.R.D. at 123.
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resources. 366 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that "[a] class
action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court., 367 The court must therefore preliminarily approve or disapprove any
settlement.368 After examining the proposed settlement and reaching a
decision, the court will pursue one of two courses. If the court disapproves
the settlement, the court is required to notify the parties of the provisions to
which it objects and instruct the parties on what must be done in order to
gain court approval of the settlement.369 If the court preliminarily approves
the settlement, the court will require that notice of the settlement be given
to all class members pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2).
No clear-cut rule prescribes when the time is right to settle a case.37 ° Some
advantages of early settlement may include reduction in litigation expenses,
avoidance of disruption to a company's business or interference with its
customers or clients, and minimization of adverse publicity. 371 On the other
hand, the disadvantages of an early settlement are a lack of sufficient
factual knowledge to make an accurate assessment of the case and loss of
the opportunity to win the case.372 Finally, it must be noted that securities
class action trials are rare.373
Private securities fraud class actions and SEC securities enforcement
actions can overlap. It has been empirically proven that private suits with
parallel SEC actions settle for significantly more than private suits without
such proceedings, and that private cases with parallel SEC actions take
substantially less time to settle than other private cases.374 The SEC, even
after the enactment of the Fair Fund provision, 375 does not seem to have
sufficient authority "to recover from wrongdoers sums equal to those that
can be recovered in private suits., 376 Therefore, this implies that even when
there is an ongoing SEC enforcement action, a private suit is necessary to
311 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (1994).
367 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
368 See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 786 (3d Cir. 1995).
369 See In re Warner Comms. Sec. Litig., 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that it is not
the function of the court to modify the terms of settlement as proposed by the parties).
370 See Tower C. Snow, Jr. et al., Defending Securities Class Actions, in SJ084 ALI-ABA
177 (1996).
371 See Schlusselberg v. Colonial Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 733 (D. Mass. 1974).
372 See Snow, supra note 370.
373 Id.
374 Cox, supra note 157, at 737.
375 Section 308(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act authorizes the SEC, at its discretion, to
apply for the benefit of victims of a securities law violation the civil penalties (i.e., fines)
collected in enforcement cases where disgorgement funds were obtained from the
respondent.
376 Cox, supra note 157, at 779.
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provide a more complete remedy for the damaged investor.
377
B. Can Italy Learn From the United States?
The Parmalat collapse clearly showed that Italian law offers minimum
protection to minority shareholders and investors. However, while the U.S.
legal system, after similar cases such as Enron and WorldCom, introduced
stringent rules to prevent financial crimes, i.e., the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, Italy is still waiting for Parliament to approve and enact a specific law
protecting investors' rights.37 8 The Parmalat case was an unquestionable
case of accounting fraud, in which the majority shareholder and his
management, for more than ten years, were able to conceal mismanagement
and convince the market, the minority shareholders, and the investors that
the company was in a solid financial situation and thus a reliable
investment. Moreover, Calisto Tanzi and his management funneled huge
amounts of the company's money into their personal accounts, not all of
which have been discovered, to the obvious detriment of thousands of
minority shareholders and investors. As described previously, Parmalat was
a pyramidal group organized and structured in order to stand under the total
control of majority shareholder, Tanzi, and to exclude minority
shareholders from any activity or control of the company. Minority
shareholders did not have the chance to prevent and oppose the fraud by
bringing a suit against the directors for liability toward the company under
article 2393-bis of the Civil Code, by filing a complaint with the Board of
Auditors under article 2408 of the Civil Code, or by reporting alleged
irregularities in the management of the directors to the tribunal under article
2409 of the Civil Code because management's statements about the
financial situation of the company, as well as the auditing the firm's
financial controls and reports, were completely false and misleading. There
was no way for the minority shareholders to learn that the company was
actually in very bad financial shape, that the stock price was overvalued, or
that the management was perpetrating a fraud in order to move company
capital into personal accounts. The Parmalat organization and structure,
however, cannot be considered unique. Conversely, Parmalat's organization
and structure are quite common among stock companies in Italy, where
pyramidal groups are widespread.3 79
Once fraud is perpetrated and disclosed, Italian law does not offer a
legal remedy that allows minority shareholders to bring a direct action
against the wrongdoers in order to recover the damages suffered. The only
377 id.
378 At present, the Italian Parliament is still discussing the draft of a law for the protection
of investors, the "disegno di legge sul risparmio."
379 See supra note 31.
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remedies are a civil action for damages, a derivative action against directors
for liability toward the company under article 2393-bis of the Civil code, or
joining with the prosecutor in a criminal proceeding claiming
compensation. None of these actions guarantees an effective recovery. A
civil action, as discussed above, is characterized by a cloud of uncertainty
and does not represent an attractive solution for a shareholder. First, the
burden of proof lies with the plaintiff/shareholder. They must give evidence
of the fraud perpetrated and of the correlation between the fraud and the
damages suffered. The asymmetry of information about a company's
business, financial, and accounting operations traditionally present between
the company's management and the shareholders, clearly renders this
burden of proof difficult to reach for a shareholder. Second, a
plaintiff/shareholder must shoulder the remarkable legal expenses by
himself and must pay for them in advance with a chance to recover only in
the event of a final victory. Italian law, in fact, forbids contingency fees.
Finally, the plaintiff/shareholder must bear the costs of the typically
long duration of lawsuits in Italy.380 The same considerations are valid for a
derivative action under article 2393-bis of the Civil Code, but with two
additional concern Above all, in the case of victory at trial, only the
company receives an effective compensation. In fact, whereas the cash flow
obtained by the company as a reimbursement theoretically increases the
value of shareholders' participation, in reality this positive effect is
distributed among all shareholders and is therefore almost impercetible to
minority shareholders. The greater the number of shareholders, the lower
the positive effect of the compensation on the shareholders' participation
will be.
Second, a lawsuit pending against current or former directors probably
could have a negative effect on the value of shareholders' participation, in
particular if this information becomes public and influences the market. In
this instance, shareholders of the listed company prefer to exit the company
selling their shares on the market, rather than sue the directors and become
entangled in an uncertain, expensive, and likely protracted litigation. Legal
expenses associated with claiming compensation in a criminal proceeding
are not as high as those required in a civil proceeding. In addition, the
investigatory activity, including the power to request discovery, is exercised
by the prosecutors and does not have to be paid by the shareholder.
However, the chance to recover damages, especially in cases in which a
large amount of injured shareholders and investor are involved, are slim. In
fact, in these kinds of criminal proceedings, such as Parmalat, the
defendants typically indicted for fraud are the managers of the company
who clearly are not able to compensate with their personal estates all the
380 See Ventoruzzo, supra note 84.
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damages they caused.
All of these reflections become more significant as we consider that
Italian law does not contemplate a class action. This means that each
shareholder must file his own claim, hire his own attorney, and sustain the
legal expenses alone. Trials related to cases like Parmalat would likely last
many years and clearly require substantial expenditures, including the
attorneys' fees but also, for instance, the expenses necessary to carry out
investigations or hire professional consultants. Moreover, as discussed
above, there is no guarantee of recovery. It therefore seems obvious that an
individual private action does not constitute an attractive or certain legal
remedy for shareholders. Besides that, there is another aspect of the
individual private action that must be considered. In cases like Parmalat, in
which a large number of shareholders were damaged (as illustrated above,
the number of Parmalat shareholders and investors was estimated between
100,000 and 200,000), if each damaged shareholder decided to file a claim
against the company, the consequence would be a correspondingly large
number of trials. Therefore, Italian judges would have to examine between
100,000 and 200,000 trials against Parmalat. These trials would most likely
be heard by different judges and would involve different facts and evidence.
Therefore, each would result in its own unique final judgment and opinion.
The divergent outcomes likely to result from such a situation demonstrate
that the individual private action is an unreliable and uncertain remedy for
shareholders.
After the Parmalat bankruptcy, one hopes that the Italian Government
will soon introduce an efficient legal remedy for defrauded investors and
shareholders, as did the United States with Rule 1 Ob-5 of the Exchange Act.
Rule lOb-5, above all, holds liable any person who directly or indirectly
violates its substantive provisions, including officers, lawyers, accountants,
and even banks. Thus, any person who makes a false or misleading
statement, which induces others to trade to their detriment violates 1 Ob-5.
In cases similar to Parmalat, where fraud is allegedly perpetrated by
management as well as banks and auditing firms, Rule lOb-5 actions assist
injured shareholders seeking to recover their investments. Compared to
criminal proceedings, the goal of Rule 1Ob-5, protection of shareholders'
rights, is achieved because it more effectively and efficiently deters
fraudulent activities that harm investors.
The securities fraud action in the Italian legal system should be
bolstered by the introduction of the class action. The experience of the
United States clearly shows that securities fraud class actions are the main,
if not the only, effective legal remedy for defrauded shareholders to recover
damages from companies. Italian shareholders and investors should have
the option to file a joint claim against the wrongdoers in order to share the
litigation expenses, bear the length of a trial, and strengthen the claim.
Additionally, class actions would reduce the likelihood of confusion
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resulting from thousands of trials. Therefore, class actions would offer
shareholders more effective protection. The introduction of a class action in
the Italian legal system is more urgent now than ever before.
The experience of the United States also reveals the role played by the
SEC in the securities market regulation-more specifically, for the
protection and compensation of defrauded shareholders. The SEC has a vast
arsenal of tools it can utilize to enforce the securities laws (investigatory
powers, administrative enforcement powers, injunctive relief, disgorgement
and monetary penalties, and criminal and contempt proceedings). Above all,
SEC enforcement actions can provide extremely important support for
private securities fraud class actions. In fact, private actions with parallel
SEC actions have proven to settle for significantly more and in significantly
less time than private suits without such parallel proceedings. It seems
clear that the active role of the SEC is necessary for securities fraud class
actions to be an efficient remedy for recovering damages. Conversely, the
CONSOB, the Italian SEC, has quite limited powers. As illustrated above,
the CONSOB controls the activity of all the entities operating in financial
markets but does not have the power to enforce the securities law.
Following the SEC example, the power of the CONSOB should be
significantly increased; in particular, it should be increased to allow the
enforcement of the securities law. An increase in power seems necessary to
achieve an efficient Italian securities fraud class action and for the effective
protection of shareholders against new fraud cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Parmalat case has clearly revealed the deficiencies of the Italian
rules of corporate governance. Above all, the Italian legal system lacks
effective protections and remedies for minority shareholders and investors
when a fraud has been perpetrated. In addition, the Parmalat case has
highlighted the marginal role of the CONSOB in relation to the protection
of investors and shareholders. A comparison with the corresponding U.S.
laws reveals that the U.S. legal system offers minority shareholders a
specific legal remedy, i.e., a private securities fraud class action under Rule
1Ob-5 of the Securities Exchange Act, to recover damages suffered. It also
reveals that when SEC enforcement actions overlap with private securities
fraud suits, these private suits settle quicker and for more money. Finally, it
has been suggested that the Italian government should introduce a private
securities fraud class action following the U.S. Rule lOb-5 action. The
introduction of such an action should be accompanied by a significant
increase in the powers of the CONSOB, in particular the power to enforce
the securities law in order to guarantee an adequate and effective recovery
of damages for injured shareholders.
